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To Namibia’s future leaders  
 
 
‘If you think anybody cares about you but yourself, you make a big mistake; as of the individual so of the race. No 
one person is going to love you more than he loves himself’1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Garvey, M (1937). Speech delivered in Winsor, Ontario Canada; September 1937. 
www.marcusgarvey.com/np6.htm.  Accessed 24
th
 December 2003 
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Abstract 
 
In 2003 the first President of the Republic of Namibia was relieved that Namibia had not taken a 
single penny from either the World Bank or the IMF3; as such, Namibia was one of the rare 
countries that had managed to do so since their independence. This scenario, unfortunately, came 
to an end in 2007 when Namibia officially requested a loan from the World Bank to start with 
the implementation of the ETSIP program4 and had thus broken its long and unusual record of 
not taking loans from the Bretton - Woods Institutions. This study, therefore, researched how and 
why Namibia stayed free from Bretton - Woods’ loans and why it eventually broke that tradition. 
The research found that Namibia had no economic crisis, whatsoever, warranting World Bank or 
IMF interventions; on the contrary, it strengthened a hypothesis advanced by Laila Smith5 
suggesting that the World Bank uses its knowledge brokering role as a device to foster lending 
relationships with countries that initially refused to do so. The research therefore suggests that 
careful and informed engagement with the World Bank and IMF will be crucial if Namibia is to 
attain its developmental goals as outlined in its Vision 2030.  
  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 New African (2003: xiv). Special Report on Namibia. IC Publications New African. November 2003 
4
 World Bank (2007: 28). Program document for a proposed first development policy loan to the Republic of 
Namibia for first Education and Training Sector Improvement program. Report No: 38571. 27 April 2007.   
5
 Smith, L (2007: 236). Power and the hierarchy of knowledge: A review of a decade of the World Bank’s 
relationship with South Africa. Science Direct Journal. Geoforum 39 (2008)  
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Introduction 
 
Namibia was one of the rare countries that had not taken money from the Bretton - Woods 
institutions since the country’s independence in 1990, but broke that tradition in May 2007. 
Theory suggests that there are various reasons why countries resort to IMF and World Bank 
loans; primary reasons include financial or economic problems or vested interests from groups 
that expect to benefit from those loans. There is also another theory which suggests that the 
World Bank, in this case, finds various means through its technical assistance programs to get 
countries, which were initially opposed to borrowing from them, to finally accepting to take 
loans6.  
 
Experience7 has shown that these institutions have their own agendas, ideologies, as well as 
interests to pursue and it is hence important to assess the implications that arise from such a 
lending relationship with these institutions.  
 
I am not merely making a case for extra - careful engagements with Bretton - Woods institution; 
instead I am arguing that loans from the World Bank or IMF should not be permitted to derail the 
developmental objectives of the country so as to suit the interest of the sponsors of Bretton – 
Woods. Namibia’s next generation will spend more time administering Bretton - Woods’ 
                                                          
6
 Smith, L (2007). Power and the hierarchy of knowledge: A review of a decade of the World Bank’s relationship 
with South Africa. Science Direct Journal  
7
 Richard Peet (2003). The Unholy Trinity. University of the Witwatersrand Press. Johannesburg; Stein, H (1999). 
Globalisation, Adjustment and the structural transformation of African economies: The role of international 
financial institutions, CSRG Working Paper No. 32 / 99 
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interests than concentrating on their own economic and human development if political leaders 
are not careful in their engagement with these institutions.  
 
Aim and Rationale 
 
The primary aim of this study is to find out how Namibia managed to stay away from World 
Bank and IMF loans and consequently find out why it eventually broke that tradition.  
 
The research concentrates its attention on the history, ideology and practices of the Bretton 
Woods Institutions and assesses the economic, political and developmental impacts these 
policies had in several SADC countries. It also focuses on the Namibian economy as well as the 
existing relationship between Namibia and the Bretton Woods Institutions.  
 
I am interested in understanding the influence and powers that could accrue to the World Bank as 
a result of the first loan and the type of conditions attached to the World Bank loan. Will 
Namibia have to start implementing Bretton - Woods – inspired developmental programs and 
policies to keep the lender happy?  
 
The research, amongst others, tries to find out whether Namibia was enticed into breaking its 
policy of avoiding indebtedness and undue political influence of the Bretton – Woods institutions 
or whether Namibian policy makers genuinely believed that borrowing was the way forward for 
the country. Did the World Bank use its technical assistance as a base for a future lending 
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relationship with Namibia and, lastly, how will this loan affect Namibia’s policy making 
decisions?  
 
Methodology 
 
The first and primary method used in this research project was critical discourse analysis. Over 
and above the in - depth interviews, it was indeed examination of relevant literature that provided 
the most insight into the subject.  
 
An analysis of primary documentation about Namibia’s Economy, the role and operations of the 
Bretton - Woods International Financial Institutions, and an assessment of relevant 
documentation about other countries’ relationships and experiences with the World Bank and the 
IMF was arrived at through relevant data collection. The main perused documents included 
reports from the Bank of Namibia, the Ministry of Finance, National Planning Commission, 
Ministry of Education, Research Institutions and other significant documents from the Republic 
of Namibia. These were complemented by research reports from Namibia Economic Public 
Research Unit (NEPRU), as well as the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), the Labour 
Resource and Research Institute (LaRRI) and other available publications.  
 
Documents and views from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank were used to 
get an external view of Namibia’s economy as well as the Namibian Governments’ relations with 
the World Bank and IMF.  Prominent documents scrutinized included various Article IV 
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Consultations and country reports from the IMF as well as the Interim Strategy Note and other 
country documents from the World Bank8.   
 
The second method used to gather information was in-depth interviews. The goal of the in - 
depth interviews was to obtain accurate information from key stakeholders that are, and were, 
directly involved in the Namibian Economy and engaged in relations with the World Bank and 
IMF. Interviewed persons included individuals from the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of 
Education, Bank of Namibia, National Planning Commission and research institutions as well as 
NGOs, Civil Societies and Trade Unions. Most interviews occurred in structured interviews and 
questions were developed based on the information that was required.  
 
Participation in this study was voluntary and informed consent of the respondents was obtained. 
In other words, the respondents had the freedom to choose whether to participate or not after 
they were thoroughly briefed on the proposed study. The researcher further ensured that the 
rationale, procedures, and confidentiality of information were to be upheld as stated in the 
interview request letters.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 Latest available documents  
Iipumbu Sakaria 
University of the Witwatersrand  
Masters Research Report 2009      
 
13 
 
Limitations and strength of the study 
 
The data collection was guided by the research questions and indeed the available literature and 
the methods applied may not have provided all the answers. Different methodologies were 
considered but the most appropriate one remained the one that was applied. I have, as well, been 
thoughtful about my own limitation to the extent to which I could answer the research question.  
 
The literature review could not fully provide answers to the research questions as past 
experiences of other countries could only provide a partial analysis to Namibia’s own case. It 
was difficult to find proof that the World Bank had changed over time or whether their staff had 
different attitudes to Africa. Namibia differed to most other countries in the sense that they did 
not seek the loan due to economic problems or vested interests. Even though it is difficult to 
know whether people tell the truth I got the impression that the interviewees gave a fairly 
accurate presentation of their attitudes and I could not find vested interests to conceal or hide 
certain information; instead I found people quite comfortable sharing their thoughts with me.  
 
The research obviously missed many factors for consideration as there was not sufficient time to 
explore everything and there hence remain, of course, many more areas for future research.  
 
Time limitations meant that the research proposal had to be narrowed down as much as possible 
so as to allow for its timely completion. This time limit put the researcher under great pressure to 
travel to Namibia to conduct the major fieldwork in that country when time and resources 
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permitted. Therefore, the views from the Ministry of Finance and the IMF were sourced from 
their official documents rather than in face to face interviews. As this is the first time the World 
Bank is ever lending money to the Government of Namibia there is no track record to assess all 
the risks associated with lending9. 
 
On the positive side though, the researcher managed to meet and interview the First and 
Founding President of the Republic of Namibia, His Excellency Dr. Sam Nujoma to understand 
why he stayed away from Bretton - Woods loans, the Rt. Honourable Prime Minister Nahas 
Angula who explained the status quo of the current government as well as the Governor of the 
Bank of Namibia, Mr. Tom Alweendo, who provided relevant economic information and 
assurance. The researcher also managed to interview three World Bank representatives dealing 
with Namibia as well as the manager of the ETSIP Program, a senior researcher from LaRRI and 
a diamond research fellow; just to mention a few.  
 
The ultimate strength of the research though, lay in the fact that the researcher had a profound 
interest in the study and hence did everything in his ability to get the most accurate information 
available to him at that time and under the prevailing circumstances.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9
 World Bank (2007: 3). Proposed first development policy loan to the Republic of Namibia for a first education and 
training sector improvement program. Report No: 38571. Washington 
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Structure of the report 
 
Chapter 1 covers the literature review and provides background information on the Bretton - 
Woods International Financial Institutions, starting with the history of the World Bank and IMF, 
their practices and policies and how these affected recipient countries. Special attention was 
given to the structural adjustment programs as they were predominantly experimented and 
imposed on African countries.  
 
The second chapter looks at the Namibian economy and the objective of this chapter is to 
initially provide an analysis of the economy since independence and, secondly, to assess whether 
Namibia had to take that loan due to financial or economic insufficiencies. That chapter 
concludes with a presentation of the major challenges faced by Namibia.  
 
Chapter 3 focuses on Namibia’s relations with the World Bank and IMF from independence until 
2008. This chapter might give the reader an understanding of projects and technical assistance 
provided to Namibia by the World Bank and IMF.  
 
The fourth chapter briefly describes the ETSIP program and the World Bank loan that was 
literally attached to it. It is important to understand that the World Bank was highly involved in 
the development of the ETSIP program, first through technical assistance which has now 
culminated into a lending relation with a country that initially stayed away from Bretton - 
Woods’ loans.   
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Chapter 5 provides the research findings of the study while the conclusion suggests 
recommendations to the future generation of Namibian leaders in their envisaged engagement 
with the Bretton Woods International Financial Institutions.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
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Neoliberal thought, as described by Joseph Cohen10, is a process that ‘seeks to transfer control of 
the economy from state to the private sector’ and mainly deals with the market liberal policies 
often associated with the ‘Washington Consensus11’ in opposition to, mostly, Keynesianism. The 
distinguishing feature between these policies is the role of the state in the economy and 
development of the country. Whereas policy - makers from 1945 – 1970 were predominantly 
advancing a significant role of the state through employment creation and the regulation of the 
economy12, policy makers after the 1970s advanced a more market – based approach to 
development and the regulations of the economy.  
 
This neoliberal thought has been advanced and supported by Washington – based international 
financial institutions like the World Bank and the IMF and the policies they advocate include, 
amongst others, fiscal discipline, reducing public expenditures, tax reforms, interest rates, 
competitive exchange rates, trade liberalisation, encouraging foreign direct investments, 
competitive economy and securing property rights13.  
 
These policies predominantly shape Structural Adjustment Programs and Poverty Recovery 
Strategy Papers that countries have to implement as a condition for getting aid from the Bretton – 
Woods Institutions.  
 
                                                          
10
 Cohen, Joseph Nathan (2007). "The Impact of Neoliberalism, Political Institutions and Financial Autonomy on 
Economic Development, 1980–2003" Dissertation, Department of Sociology, Princeton University. Defended June 
2007 
11
 Economic policies predominantly advanced by the Washington – based international financial institutions like 
the World Bank and IMF 
12
 Keynes (1937) and Polanyi (1944), for example  
13
 Peet (2003: 205). The Unholy Trinity. University of the Witwatersrand Press. Johannesburg  
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Consequences of SAPs included considerable higher unemployment, stagnant growth, eroding of 
sovereignty, accountability to international institutions instead of the electorates, flooding of 
foreign companies to the detriment of local companies and potential political upheavals due to 
discontent with these foreign advised adjustments and hence pose a potential threat to the well 
being of African or developing countries14.   
 
This literature review, therefore, looks at the policies, practices and philosophies of the Bretton - 
Woods Institutions and analyses how these affected some Sub–Saharan African countries that 
took loans from the World Bank or the IMF. As Namibia has taken out its first ever loan from 
the World Bank it can learn a lesson from the experiences of other countries to assess the 
magnitude of its new engagement with these institutions.  
 
The end of colonial rule in Africa brought the newly independent African States into the centre 
of Eurocentric ideological struggles involving neo-colonial forces in the area of economic 
development and modernisation which gave the capitalist powers in Europe and the United 
States the ability to demonstrate that the road to sustained economic growth lay in the replication 
of the Western historical experience15. According to Abrokwaa16 ‘the inherited chain of 
economic dependence forged during the colonial era ensured that economic, political, and 
educational models central to capitalist expansion would continue to play a hegemonic role in 
determining post–independence African development strategies’.  
 
                                                          
14
 See, amongst others,  Peet (2003), Mwanza (1992), Soludo and Mwakandire (1999), 
15
 In various writings of Kwame Nkrumah; 1963 and 1965 for example 
16
 Abrokwaa, C (1999). Africa 2000: What Development Strategy? Journal of Black Studies. SAGE Publications  
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As a consequence, the issue of development engaged the attention of almost all independent 
African governments, making Eurocentric development strategies the foundation of policy 
decisions in ‘post colonial’ Africa. Nevertheless, after nearly half a century of firm belief in, and 
adoption of, imported Western development ideologies and strategies in efforts to achieve 
modernisation, it is painfully evident that Africa continues to be underdeveloped, poor, heavily 
indebted to its ex – colonial rulers, and struggling with insurmountable internal socio – economic 
problems17.  
 
It is only fair to note that these external influences were not the only reason for this turmoil as 
internal factors surely contributed to it too; but the external ones did have significant influence to 
contribute to the above mentioned failures in many countries.  
 
Namibia, unlike many Sub – Saharan African countries, had not taken loans from either the 
World Bank or the IMF but decided to break that tradition in 2007 when it officially requested a 
loan from the World Bank for the ETSIP Program18. As institutions like the World Bank have 
their own agenda and interests to pursue it is important to note this strategic change of practice 
and hence analyse whether this initial first loan to Namibia will pave the way for more and 
further loans from the World Bank. Could this be the beginning of Structural Adjustment-type 
Programs and neoliberal economic policies for Namibia? What made Namibia change its policies 
and take the loan from the World Bank if history has shown that relationships with the World 
                                                          
17
 Ibid 
18
 World Bank (2007: 28). Program document for a proposed first development policy loan to the Republic of 
Namibia for first Education and Training Sector Improvement program. Report No: 38571. 27 April 2007.   
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Bank have not been very promising for developing countries19? Has Namibia fallen into the 
initial traps of the neoliberal economic doctrines that are associated with the Washington 
consensus?  
  
There are different ways that IMF and World Bank advance neoliberal philosophies; some 
countries find themselves in economic crises and thus resort to taking loans from either the 
World Bank or the IMF who then impose and suggest structural reforms. In Tanzania20, although 
the political leadership was initially against adjustments as advised by the World Bank and the 
IMF, the economic crisis towards the end of the 1970s and the pressure emanating from the 
Bretton - Woods institutions subsequently led Tanzania with no other choice but to adopt 
Structural Adjustment Programs which then led to a full scale Economic Recovery Program 
supervised by the IMF21.  
 
In Zimbabwe, according to Tor Skalnes22, there was no economic crisis that warranted the policy 
shift to agree to Structural Adjustment Programs. Tor Skalnes rather shows that pressure from 
interest groups, both domestic and external, can influence a government to adopt structural 
adjustment programs23. In the case of Zimbabwe the manufacturing industry lobbied hard, with 
the assistance of other pressure groups, to get Zimbabwe to agree to structural adjustment 
                                                          
19
 Mwanza, A (1992). Structural Adjustment Programs in the SADC. Natprint. Harare 
20
 Kiondo, A (1993). Political implications of Tanzania’s economic reforms: 1982 – 1984. Conference Paper 
presented in October 1993. University of Dares Salaam  
21
 Ibid: 43 
22
 Skalnes, T (1993). The State, Interest Groups and Structural Adjustment in Zimbabwe. Journal of Development 
Studies. 29: 401 - 428 
23
 Ibid: 402 
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programs. Thus, according to Skalnes, there was no pressure from outside to introduce these 
programs but internal interests that aimed to gain from these reforms.  
 
South Africa also adopted neoliberal policies despite being under very little pressure to accede to 
World Bank or IMF demands. This is demonstrated in Hein Marais’ book published in 1998 
where Marais states that: 
 
‘….many African countries could justifiably claim to have had little choice but to submit to IMF – decreed 
Structural Adjustment Programs. But the complicity of national elites in their enfeebling adjustments and the 
benefits they seek to draw from them has been a consistent factor. All the more so in South Africa’s case, where the 
leverage of the IMF and World Bank is minimal and where the level of economic development provides 
manoeuvring space unavailable to a country such as Ghana’24. 
 
Laila Smith25 added to this arguing that the World Bank used its knowledge brokering role as a 
device to facilitate the development of a lending relationship with South Africa which was 
initially reluctant to enter into this kind of engagement. There was hence internal as well as 
external pressure to adopt neoliberal policies.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24
 Marais, H (1998: 142). South Africa: limits to change: the political economy of transition. Zed Press 
25
 Smith, L (2007: 236). Power and the hierarchy of knowledge: A review of a decade of the World Bank’s 
relationship with South Africa. Science Direct Journal. Geoforum 39 (2008)  
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Understanding the World Bank and the IMF  
 
The World Bank and IMF have their roots in the Bretton - Woods Conference that took place 
from the 1st – 22nd July 1944 in New Hampshire, USA. This conference was led by the United 
States of America (USA) and the United Kingdom (UK) who aspired to discuss economic plans 
for the post – war period26. As the world was still engulfed in World War II, nations sought 
peace through international economic cooperation and regulation to make the flow of capital and 
goods un - free and uncontrolled27. At the back of many leaders’ minds was the Great Depression 
of the 1930s that led to economic chaos caused by uncontrolled finance. As World War II was 
approaching an end, the leaders at that time decided that they need to prevent such a situation at 
all costs and hence came together to work on preventative measures28.  
 
The Bretton - Woods conference thus created the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), today better known as the 
World Bank. At that same meeting another institution, the International Trade Organization 
(ITO), was created and transformed itself from GATT29 into the World Trade Organisation in 
1995. This paper will confine itself to the practices, policies and attitudes of the World Bank and 
the IMF only. 
 
                                                          
26
 Peet, R (2003: 27). The Unholy Trinity. Wits University Press. Johannesburg  
27
 Ibid 
28
 Peet (2003) 
29
 General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
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It is important to understand the situation before the creation of the Bretton - Woods institutions 
to fully grasp their roles. According to Richard Peet30, the era between 1875 and 1914 was 
characterized by peace amongst European nations and the racist notion to annex colonies through 
imperialism and trade. Until then the international economic trade order was rather stable as 
currencies were backed by the gold standard led by the supremacy of Britain. The 1st World War 
had negative effects on Britain as it lost its political and military power to countries like France 
and Germany31.  
 
Communism, on the other hand, was progressing and seemed not affected by the happenings in 
the capitalist countries. Something urgently had to be done to, firstly, lessen the economic 
catastrophe and, secondly, to protect the capitalist hegemony from the threats of communism and 
fascism. That is when countries started thinking about economic collaboration which was in fact 
initially advanced by the bankers who seemed more concerned with finding an economic 
solution to the problems at hand32.  
 
As Britain, the former industrial frontrunner, was negatively affected by the War, room was 
created for a new power to take over from Britain and since the USA was not seriously affected 
by WW II it was in a perfect position to take over that new role as the world’s new leader. 
European countries, on the one hand, wanted the US to take over as it had the financial and 
military power to defend Europe from falling to communism, but on the other hand, were also 
                                                          
30
 Peet (2003: 28) 
31
 See Block (1997) & Peet (2003) 
32
 Peet (2003: 28) 
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sceptical of the powers that the US was thus to acquire33. As Helleiner (1994) and Block (1997) 
point out, the US was not prepared to take on the type of role that Britain played in stabilizing 
the global financial system and the Gold Standard. As a result, the attempt to return to the Gold 
Standard failed and contributed to the development of the Great Depression.  
 
The Bretton - Woods conference was consequently predominantly prepared by the USA with the 
assistance of the UK; the USA led and UK was involved as a negotiating partner, but resolved 
policies were largely those favoured by the USA. Most countries only saw the documents at the 
actual conference and by the end of the day, did not quite know what exactly they had signed or 
entered themselves into34. The power of finances hence shifted from London to Wall Street in 
New York. Alternatives to US drafts were not encouraged whilst all secretaries and their 
assistants were Americans to ensure that minutes and conference documents met US interests35; 
the technical discourse of the conference was further beyond the reach of non - experts.  
 
Roles of the World Bank and IMF 
 
The IMF was created for two reasons, namely for the regulation of foreign currency exchange 
and for assisting countries that faced balance of payment problems. The IBRD, on the other 
hand, was created to assist post – war European reconstruction. The World Bank’s role before 
the 1980s was thus reminiscent of its name as it concentrated on the reconstruction and 
development of the European countries that had been ravaged by WW II. Towards the late 1960s 
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European countries had recovered and the World Bank all of a sudden did not have too many 
‘customers’ anymore.  
 
In 1968 the World Bank got a new president in the person of Robert McNamara who was an 
influential figure in the USA and played a significant role in the Vietnam War. McNamara made 
it his point to contribute to the fight against poverty and thus more developing countries, instead 
of just European countries, became beneficiaries of the World Bank programs36. That is where 
the now freed colonies played a significant role.  
 
According to the first President of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, the World Bank was controversial 
at that time already as it;  
 
‘forced would - be borrowers to submit to various offensive conditions, such as supplying information about their 
economies, submitting their policy and plans to review by the World Bank and accepting agency supervision of their 
use of loans. As for the alleged development, between 1960 and mid – 1963 the International Development 
Association promised a total of U$500 million to applicants, out of which only U$70 million was actually 
received37.’  
 
As time went on the World Bank changed dramatically, to the extent that Peet referred to them as 
acting or behaving like a development agency whose dream is ‘a world without poverty’38. The 
World Bank initially concentrated on reconstructing European war – torn countries and then 
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resorted to poverty alleviation as most countries were recovering from the damages of the war, 
poor countries were predominantly in South America and Africa and its focus therefore shifted 
more to these continents. At first, lending money for social programs like education and health, 
were seen as a waste of precious resources but it moved away from that philosophy and then 
started funding education and health projects as well. The first ever loan to Namibia is to reform 
education in that country39.  
 
According to Peet (2003), the Cold War played a great part in the World Bank’s focus on social 
lending to 3rd World Countries as there was a need to influence geo - strategic areas of the globe; 
as well as the Bank needing new ‘areas’ to lend money to as Europe was recovering. They 
referred to it as ‘investment for peace’40.  
 
The real World Bank controversies arose after the oil crisis when countries needed foreign 
exchange to import oil; the World Bank strategically used these loans to induce ‘reforms’ in 
recipient countries41. These ‘reforms’ came in the form of Structural Adjustment Programs 
(SAPs) that demanded that countries ‘reform’ their economies and reduce state intervention in 
their markets. It further paved the way for demanding the liberalisation of capital and financial 
markets and removing subsidies while advancing the privatisation of state owned enterprises42.  
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These interventionist policies became evident when Robert McNamara left the Bank and was 
replaced by Mr. A.W Clauson. During Clauson’s tenure ‘poverty alleviation’ took a back seat 
and right wing doctrines emerged more evidently43. These were highly influenced by political 
events around the globe as Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan and Helmut Kohl took over 
control of Great Britain, the United States and Germany respectively. These leaders were firm 
believers in right wing philosophies44. 
 
 At that time it was even speculated that the World Bank had ‘socialist tendencies’ and a study 
was commissioned to find out whether the World Bank indeed had ‘socialist tendencies’. Ronald 
Reagan supported a reduction in US spending into the World Bank and conditionally – based 
loans then became the norm. The Bank now fully believed in the ‘magic of the market’45 and its 
Structural Adjustment Programs became tools to advance neo – classical economic thinking. The 
‘good governance’ doctrine became increasingly a dominant subject in the World Bank too.  
 
Due to the many failures of the Structural Adjustment Programs the Bank started talking about 
adjustments with a humane face and came up with reforms that were apparently ‘owned’ by the 
countries implementing them. This was done to remove the thought that Structural Adjustment 
Programs were advanced by the World Bank without the willingness of recipient countries. Due 
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to criticism of how the Bank did things the Bank set in motion public relations exercises; without 
really changing the way they did things though46.  
 
As mentioned already, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was created to regulate foreign 
exchange transactions and assist countries that had balance of payment problems and came into 
existence formally in December 1945 when its first members signed the Articles of Agreement. 
The IMF’s membership rose sharply in the 1960s, as a large number of former colonies became 
‘independent’, and again in the 1990s when the IMF welcomed as members the countries of the 
former Soviet bloc upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The needs of the new developing 
and transition countries were different from those of the IMF’s founding members, calling for 
the IMF to adapt its policies.  
 
Other major challenges to which it has adopted, included 
  
‘the end of the par value system and the emergence of generalised floating exchange rates among the major 
currencies following the United States’ abandonment in 1971 of the convertibility of U$ to gold, the oil price shocks 
of the 1970s, the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, the crisis in emerging financial markets in Mexico and 
Asia, and the Argentine debt default of 2001’47.  
 
The IMF is currently the world’s central organisation for international monetary cooperation and 
maintains stability and prevents crises in the international monetary system. It reviews national, 
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regional and global economic and financial developments as well as providing advice to its 
members48.  
 
Mohamed (2008)49 summarized the era between 1945 to the present very clearly. He states that 
there has been a fundamental ideological shift in thinking between the years of 1945 – 1970 and 
the years of 1970 to the present. He calls the era of 1945 – 1970 as the Golden Age of capitalism 
and refers to the era after 1970 as the neoliberal one. The ideological shift in these two eras 
regards the role of the state. From 1945 to 1970 the state was seen as a necessary agent of 
development which has been highly influenced by the likes of John Keynes and Karl Polanyi, 
amongst many others. John Keynes and Karl Polanyi all advocated for a significant role of the 
state; Keynes advocated the role of the state in creating and maintaining full employment while 
Polanyi advanced the notion that unregulated markets destroy society and therefore had to be 
regulated50.  
 
During the 1970s to the present, which Mohamed refers to as the neoliberal age, the role of the 
state has been downplayed, or discredited, by the likes of Milton Friedman and Friedrich von 
Hayek except to the extent of creating favourable investment environments.  This neoliberal area 
has unleashed free – market capitalism and is the driving force of economic globalisation. It is in 
this very era that the World Bank and the IMF have acquired amazing powers that have 
unleashed havoc on countries’ economies.   
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Structural Adjustment Programs 
 
Structural adjustments have dominated policy making in sub – Saharan Africa since the early 
1980s51 and many countries in SADC are implementing Structural Adjustment Programs that 
were initially of a short – term nature but have become more comprehensive and long ranged52. 
However, whether structural adjustment programs have been beneficial for the economies of the 
countries involved has always been controversial.  
 
Structural Adjustment Programs can be defined as the total set of policies or reforms that 
countries have to agree to implement in order to receive AID for their development. According 
to Mwanza (1992)53 “structural theories are not a recent invention as they were already being 
developed and refined in Latin American countries during the 1950s and 1960s’. Campos (1990) 
said that the ‘basic argument for the monetarist school is that inflation had reached serious 
proportions and needed to be stopped by curbing excess demand through monetary and fiscal 
policies, supplemented by international financial assistance’54.   
 
More than 20 years after the advent of World Bank and IMF – supported adjustment policies, 
controversy continues as to the effects of these reforms, both in terms of economic performance 
in general and the well being of the poor in particular. For many years it was difficult to describe 
this controversy as a debate, since there were entrenched positions on both sides. On the one 
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hand the World Bank, IMF and their supporters argued that market – oriented reform was 
necessary for the growth required to reduce poverty. On the other hand, critics argued that these 
policies increased poverty by slashing government expenditure, reducing subsidies on essential 
items, introducing user charges for social services and failing to revive growth55. Some scholars 
contend that the adjustment policies supported by the World Bank in Africa are inappropriate 
and they therefore advocate the adoption of a rather more eclectic approach. These programs 
contain concepts that have taken root in many African political debates like ‘freedom’, 
‘efficiency’, ‘modernisation’, markets and ‘liberalisation’ despite the apparent failure of these 
programs in socio – economic terms56.  
 
The World Bank model for structural adjustment programs for Africa was articulated in its 1981 
World Development Report. That report acknowledged the structural and external factors that 
lead to crises ‘but argued that the economic crises were caused and aggravated by government 
policies that stood in the way of efficient markets57. Until today the World Bank and the IMF do 
their best to limit government intervention in the market by arguing that the market, left to itself, 
will function better. Polanyi58 argues to the contrary, that the market left to itself will not 
function well as it would devour society through its quest to commodify everything, and in order 
to prevent that state intervention was necessary to protect society from the market.  
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The World Bank further argued that there was an urgent need to eradicate government – 
perpetrated economic distortions, such as overvalued rates, price controls and inefficient 
government intervention through the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programs. 
Structural type of adjustments, even though seen as able to help countries; has often led to 
deteriorating terms of trade mainly brought about by declining prices of exports and rising prices 
of imports59. 
 
According to Streeten60 adjustments are aimed at reducing the vulnerability of the given 
economy to future shocks by increasing flexibility and adaptability through the interplay of 
market forces. This is one fundamental aspect of Structural Adjustment Programs as they are all 
predominantly aimed at reducing state participation in the economy and consequently allowing 
market forces to operate freely, a recent example is Seychelles61. The underlying assumption is 
that the private sector is more effectient than the public sector; the other factor, though not 
mentioned, is that opening up markets gives corporations more power to do what they want. 
Mwanza thus sees Structural Adjustment Programs as ‘essentially privatisation programs’62. As 
economic growth, in most cases of structural adjustments declines, one can generally state that 
SAPs are not essentially designed to stimulate economic growth63.  
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The opening up of local markets, through structural adjustment programmes, undermined local 
businesses because they were followed by the inflow of foreign private companies and capital. 
“In fact, most countries implementing SAPs are characterised by low or stagnant economic 
performance, increasing income inequality, declining currency values and rising inflation and 
unemployment64. Further critics argued that SAPs led to higher unemployment, greater 
insecurity, environmental damage, reduced government services and social spending and further 
redistribution of wealth from the poor to the rich65.  
 
Some SADC experiences 
 
According to Mwanza66, the main reasons Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and Tanzania sought 
assistance from the World Bank and IMF was due to the fact that they were all experiencing 
large internal and external trade imbalances, although in varying degrees67. The above mentioned 
countries sought help from the World Bank as they were mainly characterised by external 
imbalances, unemployment and dormant or diminishing economic performances and all these 
countries received similar structural adjustment programs even though the countries differ 
greatly. This is not surprising as Structural Adjustment Programs are known to be of the ‘one 
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size fits all’ policy68. It is like giving patients suffering from different ailments literally the same 
medicine which is, obviously, bound to end catastrophic.  
 
 In both Malawi and Zambia, adjustment efforts began during the early 1980s in response to 
declining economic performance. Tanzania and Zambia even went to the extent of trying out 
‘home – grown’ programs but the IMF and World Bank did not support these and eventually 
forced those countries to implement IMF / World Bank designed and sponsored adjustment 
programs69. This suggests that the IMF and World Bank are more interested in the 
implementation of their own programs instead of any other alternatives that would be outside of 
their control.  
 
Implementation of structural adjustment programs is considered to be one way of winning the 
support of the donor country despite an observed tendency for aid receivers to become more 
indebted to the IMF and the World Bank70. Rise in debt service puts strains on the already 
meagre resources of developing countries and Zambia’s debt crisis, for example, had been 
symptom and cause of the economic crisis during the early 1990s. 
 
Structural adjustment programmes also have political implications as they detach the masses of 
African people from any formal political organisation71 . When Tanzania and Zambia showed 
some resistance to certain aspects of adjustment programs and attempted to design alternative 
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reform programs, financial and economic blackmail and, in some cases, pressure and propaganda 
were used by the donor community to bring these countries back to the IMF and World Bank 
fold72. It is astonishing that a ‘donor’ will literally go to that extent to have you within their fold; 
essentially, you do not force anybody to be ‘assisted’ by you. In such a case, the word assistance 
loses its true meaning, because assistance comes from the heart and if you have to ‘coerce’ 
somebody to assist him, then there should be clearly other motives behind that assistance.  
 
The Zambian example has indicated the political consequences associated with structural 
adjustments as these unfavourable IMF / World Bank policies led to rioting, urban violence and 
the dissolution of the social fabric73. ‘Strikes and riots in 1983 - 4 led to some backtracking; riots 
in December 1986 over a maize price rise were a profound shock to the Zambian government, 
and escalating strikes in January to May 1987 including riots in April over a petrol price rise 
were the final straws in the governments’ decision to abandon IMF talks’74. 
  
Several IMF proposals in draft letters of intent surprised the Zambians, thus exacerbating internal 
division and delay of these programs75. Controversy was also evident when it came to the 
amount of adjustment needed to return the balance of payment to equilibrium, the economic 
feasibility of the program and the amount of adjustment that was needed to correct inadequate 
policies. According to Martin (1991) ‘government internal divisions was the key factor delaying 
or preventing agreement as the ministries and central banks, economic advisors, cabinet, party 
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leadership and leaders of the armed forces were always divided over whether they should pursue 
structural adjustments or not’76. These divisions reflected beliefs, interests and power while 
unrealistic expectations of quick results disillusioned government and the people. 
 
After seeing that divisions and popular protest were growing President Kenneth Kaunda came to 
believe that the political and social costs of the program outweighed its economic benefits and 
gradually decided to end talks77.  
 
The IMF and World Bank believe that the elimination of protective tariffs will make domestic 
industries more competitive.  In reality, domestic manufacturing often collapsed and imported 
consumer goods replaced domestic products, while unemployment escalated. After multinational 
companies drive out local competition they use their monopoly power to raise prices and the 
‘benefits’ of low prices are then, obviously, short lived78.  
 
Furthermore, introduction of SAPs meant that most countries had to make major cuts in their 
education and health budgets to cut fiscal deficits. This is obviously a direct blow to human 
development as every nation needs educated and healthy citizens that can contribute to a 
countries’ development. This further led people to rebel against the decisions of their 
governments, while opposition political parties used these unrests to score cheap political points 
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by denouncing the actions of the government. Indeed, these policies resulted into social and 
political chaos79.  
 
One of the lessons learned from the Zambian experience is that a country can easily ‘rebel’ 
against Structural Adjustment Programs. When attempts were made to scrap the maize meal 
subsidies the populace felt provoked and resorted to food riots80 which eventually led to the 
erosion of the political support for the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP). The 
UNIP did not survive the elections as the opposition MMD Party came to power promising to 
resolve the subsidy issues. Another lesson from Zambia shows that a lack of popular support for 
Structural Adjustment Programs can lead to its failure; especially true if the population is only 
informed after the decision has been made to implement these programs. It is practically evident 
that a lot of secrecy surrounds the design or implementation of adjustment programs’81.  
 
According to Mwanza82 the evidence from the four case studies suggests that structural 
adjustment policies are not genuine development strategies but conditionalities that advance the 
reign of the market. This is evidenced by the fact that structural adjustments advocate the 
reduction of government ‘intervention’ in the market and the increased role for private capital, as 
we saw with the recent example of Seychelles.   
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As Namibia has broken its tradition of not taking loans from either the World Bank or the IMF to 
actually taking a loan from the World Bank; Namibia will have to prepare to deal with this ‘new’ 
relationship. ‘Aid’ from these institutions is not as friendly as it sounds, as history, in most cases, 
has shown. The first President of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, explained some of the conditions 
that come with these so – called ‘Aid’ in a book released in 1965; he said:  
 
‘....nor is the whole story of ‘aid’ contained in figures, for there are conditions which hedge 
around it: the conclusion of commerce and navigation treaties; agreements for economic 
cooperation; the right to meddle in internal finances, including currency and foreign exchange, 
to lower trade barriers in favour of the donour country’s goods and capital; to protect the 
interests of private investments; determination of how the funds are to be used; forcing the 
recipient to set up counterpart funds; to supply raw materials to the donour; and use of such 
funds – a majority of it, in fact – to buy goods from the donour nation. These conditions apply to 
industry, commerce, agriculture, shipping and insurance, apart from others which are political 
and military’83.  
 
It is difficult to imagine that the World Bank would change its ‘modus of operandi’ just to suit 
Namibia. 
 
The advocacy for trade liberalisation, usually packaged in Structural Adjustment programs, is 
probably what the IMF and World Bank is best known for. Richard Peet argues that these 
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institutions have literally imposed identical sets of neoliberal economic policies to all countries 
that came to them for assistance84. Peet further found that the IMF and World Bank cooperate in 
a coherent and unifying policy position of ‘free trade’.  
 
Reducing public expenditure usually takes the form of reduced spending on health, education, 
defence and public administration. Ideally, countries are told to reduce their public sectors in 
order to cut costs, as Uganda noticed85. This has massive unemployment implications and can 
lead to discontent among the citizenry. 
 
Trade liberalisation, is hence seen as one of the most controversial conditions of these loans as 
countries are additionally advised to treat local and foreign firms on the same basis and should 
not discriminate against on that basis86.  
 
The Bretton Woods’ conditionalities do not sound harsh and bad on paper but the history of 
industrial development shows that the current developed countries have not generally used the 
type of economic policies they now advise to developing countries.  To fully understand the 
contradictions of current development policies we refer to Ha - Joong Chang (2005) who 
concluded that, “ in most of the now developed countries, policies that were used are almost the 
opposite of what the present orthodoxy says they employed and currently recommend that the 
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presently developing countries should use87”. Looking at today’s development policies and 
philosophies makes it clear that there have been few attempts to apply the lessons that have been 
learned from the historic experiences of developed countries to problems facing contemporary 
development.  
 
During the 1870s free market policies were advancing pretty well in Britain due to internal and 
international macroeconomic stability, low barriers to the international flow of goods and sound 
industrial policies at home88. Then came the First World War and countries reversed the free 
market policies and returned once again to trade barriers. The United States of America, 
Germany and other countries followed the lead, introduced or increased tariffs and proceeded 
with the creation of cartels and combines in order to strengthen their economies. Free Trade 
ended when Britain officially reintroduced tariffs89. 
 
In order to protect their industries, “virtually all developed countries actively used interventionist 
industrial trade and technology policies aimed at promoting infant industries during their catch – 
up period. Some countries, notably Britain and the USA, used these policies even after they had 
caught up90; indicating that industries of the current developed countries were protected through 
tariffs. These tariffs ensured that it become costly to import manufactured goods and thus rather 
promoted the exportation of finished products.  
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A typical example of this hypocrisy was African colonies which were essentially importers of 
western finished goods and exporters of African raw materials91. In the west trade subsidies were 
implemented providing incentives to manufacturers while governments focused on investing in 
public – private enterprises in order to strengthen their industries. Historically, and until today, 
the USA is known to have been the most protective economy in the world, in spite of their 
current advocacy for ‘free trade’92.  
 
With regards to democracy, as advocated today, it is worth noting that current developed 
countries believed that democracy was not good for economic development as it was seen as 
rather too expensive to maintain93. Most developed countries first developed their economies and 
only then resorted to democratic governance.  
 
In short, there is a contradiction between the neoliberal development philosophies that are 
preached by the Bretton - Woods International Financial Institutions and advised to developing 
countries, and the philosophies that most Western and East Asian countries used to develop. 
They preach that developing countries must be democratic while they themselves were not 
democratic at that stage; the ‘good governance’ doctrines of the World Bank are a case here. 
This evident hypocrisy, unfortunately, questions the morality and genuine intention of these 
conditionalities. It is strange to prescribe a patient a medicine that one self has never taken at that 
time of being sick, as a matter of fact that medicine is historically known to have not been used 
by such ‘patients’.  
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Developed countries used protectionist principles during their stage of development, just like the 
East Asian countries94. There is currently a comparable difference between the development of 
Latin American countries that adhered to the neoliberal ‘Washington consensus’ doctrine and the 
East Asian countries95, that used literally the opposite route from the one prescribed by the 
Washington consensus;  
 
Peet (2003) is of the opinion that the World Bank and IMF have been captured by a neoliberal 
ideology that places them on the side of those who already have so much money they know not 
what to do with it96. Stieglitz emphasises that economic globalisation has left many countries 
worse off; the rules of the game are not fair and have been designed to benefit the industrial 
countries while economic policies that were advanced for needy countries where neither 
appropriate or progressive97.  
 
To understand why institutions behave the way they do requires an understanding of the interests 
that are at play behind the scenes to comprehend in whose interest this institutional complex 
works. To answer that question we need to look at the suppliers of capital and political power to 
institutions; with regards to the Bretton - Woods Institutions it is the finance capitalists, mostly 
bankers from Wall Street, multinational companies and the political institutions of Washington 
                                                          
94
 Stieglitz (2002) 
95
 Sometimes even referred to as the ‘miracle countries’ 
96
 Peet (2003: 223) 
97
 Stieglitz (2007: 9). Making Globalisation work: The next steps to global justice. Allen Lane, London 
Iipumbu Sakaria 
University of the Witwatersrand  
Masters Research Report 2009      
 
44 
 
that give them that leverage98. Can the World Bank and the IMF then actually implement 
philosophies without regards to the powers that be?  
 
Hall and Sikkink99  talked about interests and ideologies and from Hall ( 1989) we learned that; 
“any new idea that is to be introduced to become policy or to be considered for implementation 
has to go through a certain process where its feasibility will have to be analysed so as to make 
sound judgements whether that new idea should actually be accepted or not”. In other words, 
before a policy or set of ideas can be implemented it needs to be politically, economically and 
administratively viable100.  
 
According to Hall (1989) there are four kinds of factors that affect the influence of proposals, 
namely the orientation of the governing party, the structure of the state and state – society 
relations, the nature of national economic discussion and current prevailing events101. Economic 
viability refers to the capacity of the new idea to solve current economic problems102. Current 
economic problems, in this case, can relate to the fact that capital needs new markets to operate 
in as it has mostly saturated its own, usually local, market and needs new room for manoeuvre. 
This would justify the call for countries to liberalise their financial and capital markets to create 
room for Wall Street bankers and multinational companies to enter.  
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Another important aspect that all new ideas have to comply with is the administrative viability of 
that new proposal. This plainly means that the new idea must be implementable in the current 
system and preferably with as little additional costs as possible.  
 
A total overhaul of the new system, with additional administrative costs, is always seen as rather 
unnecessary and would thus preferably be avoided; those quarters that call for reform and other 
changes in the global financial institutions must take this point into perspective. No institution 
will willingly reform itself if that exercise is seen as costly, ineffective and cumbersome. The 
World Bank and IMF have over time acquired vital information and knowledge on how to run 
their administration. In such cases it is more difficult to find a new design that will be 
administratively feasible considering the tremendous administrative infrastructure, especially 
knowledge - based, that is already at hand. Administrative viability is very important because if 
an idea is seen as not being feasible or seemingly too difficult and complex to be implemented it 
will, by and large, be discouraged and rejected.   
 
No policy can further be implemented if it does not appeal to the politicians at hand103. If 
anybody wants to reform the World Bank or IMF they will have to appeal to the political powers 
that be. In this case we are predominantly dealing with the politics of Washington. They have 
their own interests in keeping the institutions the way they are and will not jeopardise the gains 
that they derive from these institutions by changing or reforming them just to suit those who 
suffer due to those policies. The overall goal of the political parties in power plays a big role, as 
                                                          
103
 Hall (1989: 347) 
Iipumbu Sakaria 
University of the Witwatersrand  
Masters Research Report 2009      
 
46 
 
well as the perceived interests of the various coalition partners that would be part of the 
envisaged policy. New ideas will also be measured against other matters that are high on the 
prevailing political agenda and, of course, an important thing will be how the advocates of a 
certain philosophy are viewed in public.  
 
The ones that call for reform in financial global institutions are usually not well perceived. They 
are more often than not labelled as leftists, anarchists or troublemakers and will thus not be taken 
seriously enough to change the hearts and minds of the political powers that be. This just goes to 
say that the character of the people who advocate policies play a vital role in whether the idea 
will be accepted or not. Taking all this into consideration it is really difficult for the World Bank 
and IMF to come up with projects that are purely and in the truest sense to the advantage of 
recipient countries; their own interests, especially the interests of financiers and politicians, 
comes first.  
 
On the other hand though, the advocates of neoliberal globalisation argue that globalisation and 
its leading financial institutions are largely misunderstood. Martin Wolf author of Why 
Globalisation Works (2005) defends this globalisation by arguing that the failure of our world is 
not that there is too much globalisation but that there is too little. The potential for greater 
economic integration is barely tapped. Wolf’s main argument is that ‘globalisation has been a 
progressive force throughout history, and that the expansion of markets across borders is both 
morally and materially superior to placing restrictions on this process, and the criticisms that 
have been leveled against various aspects of globalisation are either misinformed, misconceived 
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or even both’104. According to Martin Wolf trade liberalization has created opportunities for 
countries to compete and specialize in products that they have a comparative advantage in, and it 
forces countries to be constantly innovative and finding ways to improve their productivity. 
 
 Martin Wolf105 further talks about how globalisation promotes desirable objectives such as 
economic growth, reduction in poverty and inequality, good governance and personal freedom 
and all who cherish these ideals should thus support globalisation. Wolf opines that the 
opponents of globalisation have their facts wrong as they often do not understand how markets 
work and their solutions can thus only reduce both the welfare and freedom of people throughout 
the world. Globalisation and the expansion of markets actually bring people closer as there is an 
exchange of cultural, political and technological experiences; thus restricting globalisation can 
only lead to fascism and international trade restriction. 
 
Therefore globalisation is an old phenomenon and should not be discredited at this time just 
because people don’t understand it. One can only benefit from engaging with globalisation and 
hence Wolf thinks that there are many trading opportunities available to developing countries if 
they just make use of them. He further elaborates that globalisation is neither the cause of 
poverty nor a panacea. Instead; countries should rather develop the institutions and the politics 
that will allow them to take full advantage of the opportunities that are offered by international 
markets106.  
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Ferrard et al107 also argue that markets work for the poor as they are the organizing principles of 
production and consumption, meaning that the good performance of the market is good for 
everybody. Markets, according to Ferrard et al, are part of people’s daily reality, lead to 
substantial reductions in poverty and therefore need to be made to work for you instead of 
working against you and they cite China and South Asia who have obtained salaries that are 
beyond the poverty line due to the market108.  In explaining why financial institutions like the 
World Bank and IMF are misunderstood Ferrard et al gave this metaphor: “while the conductor 
may know the melody he wants, the orchestra cannot play much of it and, in any case, thinks it is 
not right for them’109.  
 
This means that it is important to understand what global institutions actually advocate for in 
order to appreciate and implement it. On why policies sometimes fail, the following metaphor, 
again by Ferrard et al, was used: ‘Impulsive interveners have become players in the orchestra and 
the wider conducting task has been neglected’110. 
 
Thus markets are critical for poverty reduction and the question should rather be: ‘how can the 
market orchestra be assisted to perform well? The failure of businesses in Africa is often rather 
because of a failure to address the discontinuity that characterizes its economics, according to 
Ferrard et al, and not due to the necessary failures of the ‘Washington consensus’.  They further 
argue that development is more than a once – off hit. “It is about making a lasting and substantial 
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difference”111, meaning that developing countries should actually just hang in there and things 
will turn out fine with time. Opening eyes to new possibilities is a prerequisite for change. A pro 
– market approach is further necessarily seen as anti – government while Ferrard et al argue that 
this does not have to be the case as governments are crucial in determining how markets are to 
function.  
 
Joseph Stiglitz112 advocates the notion that economic globalisation and its leading institutions are 
not inherently bad but the way they have gone about their activities has not been appropriate or 
beneficial and therefore needs to be revisited. According to these doctrines there is a lot that is 
good about economic globalisation, especially to the benefit of consumers. It has given people an 
unlimited choice of goods; people are able to buy goods that they would not have had in their 
countries, it has also made life easier through communication and technology, as distance and 
space has been ‘reduced’. People can communicate with each other anywhere in the world and 
transport has made it quicker for people to visit each other and transport goods from one country 
to another113. 
 
Not many have disputed the benefits of economic globalisation; it is the dominant negative 
aspects that seem more like re - conlonisation than actual development114, that are a matter of 
concern to many.   
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The World Bank and IMF are convinced that what they do is for the good of humanity and 
clearly advocate that mantra through their public relations instruments. Considering all these 
different views it just makes natural sense that people and institutions tend to defend themselves 
whenever they are attacked; but it seems very clear that all these actors, through their many 
defenses, are more engaged in what Wade (1996) describes as paradigm maintenance115.  
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CHAPTER II 
NAMIBIA’S ECONOMY 
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The Namibian Economy has performed modestly over the past 18 years. Economic growth has 
averaged around 4.3% but has not been sufficient to reduce poverty and contribute to achieving 
the country’s development goals enshrined in Vision 2030116. According to the national 
development programs Namibia needs economic growth of at least 5% to reduce poverty and 
unemployment. Namibia’s economy is largely driven by the primary sector, dominated by 
diamonds and other mineral exports.  
 
Namibia’s debt ratio target is 25% of GDP which has generally been maintained at that level but 
with a few exceptions. The debt is mostly made up of local debts while foreign debt stood at 
approximately 3% of GDP, making Namibia’s debt ratios one of the lowest in the SADC region. 
Fiscally the government has been tight and has tried to keep the budget deficit below 3% which 
has not been achieved in a number of years; indeed Namibia’s first budget surplus was only 
achieved in the 2006 / 07 financial year. 
 
Since independence the country has not experienced balance of payment problems and has 
therefore never needed the assistance of the IMF.  
 
Overall, despite many challenges, Namibia’s economy has been fine and has never warranted 
IMF or World Bank interventions. Below we shall look at the segments of the economy in more 
detail. 
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Namibia has a small, open and fairly free – market economy linked to South Africa. As Namibia 
was a colony of South Africa the territory had been ruled and governed as a Province of South 
Africa and it is consequently no surprise that the Namibian Economy is heavily dependent on the 
South African economy.  
 
Initially, sovereign Namibia lacked its own monetary system as it was rigidly linked to the 
monetary system of South Africa through the Common Monetary Area; and as a result South 
Africa continued to set monetary and exchange rate policies for Namibia even after it gained 
independence117. Thus a fully-fledged Central Bank, the Bank of Namibia, was created on the 
16th July 1990 which fulfilled the role of banker to government and to local commercial banks as 
well as being supervisor of the monetary and exchange system. Namibia's own currency, the 
Namibia Dollar, was introduced on 15 September 1993, which allowed Namibia to build up 
foreign exchange reserves and to provide some scope for pursuing appropriate interest rates and 
monetary policies in the country118.  
 
The Namibia Dollar was pegged 1 to 1 to the South African Rand whilst the Rand remained a 
legal tender in Namibia until this very day. According to the Governor of Namibia’s Central 
Bank, Tom Alweendo, the economic benefits of the peg outweigh the economic costs associated 
with the peg119 and he has supported that stance ever since120.   
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GDP growth  
 
Since the time of independence Namibia has averaged a steady GDP growth of approximately 
4.3% (see figure 1 below) which has been modest but not enough to achieve Vision 2030 and 
reduce poverty121. This GDP growth over the last decade has been due to favourable conditions 
for primary sector output, especially diamonds and sound macroeconomic policies122 and not 
because of employment creation or discovering new mines 123. The negative GDP growth in 
1993, as shown below, was thus mainly due to the significant drop in diamond production, other 
mining and commercial agriculture.   
 
Figure 1 
Annual GDP growth in percentage: current prices 
 
 
*Source: Bank of Namibia, Ministry of Finance, Central Bureau of Statistics; (various) 
 
 
The rise in GDP after 1990 was due to an upswing in the mining industry since the political 
situation calmed after independence.  
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Inflation 
 
Namibia’s inflation has been moderate. The peg to the South African Rand has linked local 
inflation to South Africa’s inflation targeting framework and hence inflation trends follow 
closely the trends in South Africa124. Namibia’s inflation is thus, to a large extent, imported 
inflation transmitted through South African import prices125 and since the country had no 
currency of its own it found itself with very little policy instruments to mitigate the effects of this 
imported inflation.  
 
Figure 2 
Annual Inflation rate: percentage 
 
 
*Source: Bank of Namibia, Ministry of Finance, Central Bureau of Statistics, NEPRU 
 
Inflation increases mainly due to volatile international oil and food prices and considering that 
Namibia is an importer of both oil and food the country is vulnerable to changes in the prices of 
these goods. Namibia is further highly energy – dependent and thus feels the squeeze whenever 
oil prices rise.  
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As figure 2 above showed, inflation stood at roughly 12% at independence and sharply rose to 
18% in 1992 which was largely due to the introduction of the Value Added Taxation (VAT) in 
Namibia126.  After that it moderated and has generally been under 10% thereafter. SADC 
Bankers Data of 2007 show that Namibian inflation is higher than other SACU countries but 
lower than the average of SADC countries127.  
 
Namibia has had a current account surplus ever since independence, a record unusual among 
middle – income countries. These surpluses are not only high by Namibia’s past standards, but 
also by the standards of lower – middle income countries. In 2006 Namibia was in the top 10% 
of lower middle – income countries ranked by current account performance128 and this good 
performance was largely credited to the high global commodity prices for Namibia’s exports.  
 
The country has also benefited from strong external surpluses and between 2002 and 2005 the 
current account surplus was around 6.5% of GDP. The external current account, for the years 
2006 and 2007, rose to high levels reflecting strong diamond exports, higher prices for minerals 
and large SACU receipts129 
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Namibia is exporting its savings, mainly to South Africa, with total investments in foreign 
equities, bonds and other securities exceeding N$ 12.7 Billion in 2006130 and the upward trend 
continues unabated.  
 
Namibia, a trade–dependent country, is highly vulnerable to volatility in international financial 
markets whilst the value of its imports and exports exceeds GDP.  Its main trading partners are 
South Africa, European Union, United States of America, China, Japan and India. Exports of 
goods are dominated by a few products originating from the primary industries whereas 
consumption accounts for a large share of its imports; as a result the trade account has been in 
deficit since independence131; fortunately prices of exports have increased more rapidly than 
prices of imports and therefore have had positive effects in terms of trade.  
 
Exports account for almost 40% of GDP. Live animals and processed meat, fish and fish 
products, ores & minerals as well as copper from the copper smelter made up approximately 
87% of exported of goods in 2006132; diamonds and other minerals alone make up approximately 
60% of total export133. Agricultural exports in 1990 were dominated by cattle, small stock (goats 
and sheep) and karakul pelts while manufactured exports were overwhelmingly the fish and meat 
products and beverages, mostly beer and cold drinks134. Prior to independence Namibia’s export 
markets were limited to South Africa but due to South – South relations Namibia has broadened 
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that scope, evident in the increasing trade with a country like China.135.  With regards to imports, 
Namibia relies largely on imported foodstuffs such as maize, rice and most of its fruits despite 
the fact that most of the imported food can actually be grown in Namibia. Other major imports 
include oil, minerals and transport equipment.  
 
Sectoral contributions  
As Figure 3 below shows Namibia’s major contributors to GDP are the tertiary and the primary 
sector.  
 
Figure 3 
Sectoral contributions to GDP in percentage: current prices 
 
*Source: Central Bureaux of Statistics: National Accounts, Bank of Namibia, Ministry of Finance 
 
Namibia’s main primary sectors are mining and quarrying, fishing and agriculture. Below we 
shall deal with these subsectors individually.  
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Agriculture 
 
Agricultural plays a big role in the economy dominated by the commercial sector which is 
engaged in the export of live animals and processes meat predominantly for the export market. 
Cattle are the major source of agricultural income while other livestock farming includes pigs, 
sheep, goats and poultry.  
 
The importance of agriculture to the economy goes well beyond its contribution to GDP as it is 
one of the largest employers and sustaining some 70% of the population. One of Namibia’s 
central objectives has therefore always been to increase agricultural productivity and improve the 
incomes of rural communities so as to raise their living standards; since 2002 it is estimated that 
the expansion in irrigated grape production on the Orange River has resulted in the creation of 
nearly 7000 jobs and many more ancillary employment136.   
 
As can be seen in Figure 4 below, agricultural contribution to GDP in 1991 and 1992 stood at 
approximately 7.5% and 8% respectively. The figure below also shows that the agricultural 
sector’s output declined significantly in the years of 1992 and 1993 which was due to a severe 
drought in 1991 and 1992 which destroyed agricultural crops137 as well as affecting meat output. 
The agricultural sector is obviously dependent on climatic conditions and it is thus no surprise to 
see such fluctuations. In 1995 there was another drought which was followed by low rainfalls in 
1996 which further undermined agricultural production.  
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Figure 4 
Agricultural contribution to GDP in percentage: current prices 
 
*Source: Central Bureau of Statistics National Accounts, Bank of Namibia, Ministry of Finance 
 
A considerable part of the Namibian population, due to poverty, can be classified as vulnerable 
and food insecure and Namibia therefore needs to increase its local food production for self – 
sufficiency as it is not sustainable to import nearly 70% of food requirements; in 2003 one - third 
of the population needed humanitarian food assistance138. Irrigation schemes and projects have 
been embarked upon at the Orange and Kavango Rivers139 aimed at contributing to Namibia 
becoming self sustainable in food production.  
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Fishing industry 
 
Since independence Namibia’s fishing industry has grown to become the second largest export 
earner after mining. Namibia has focused on rebuilding the fish stocks, establishing a national 
industry namibianising ownership and employment in the sector140.   
 
Due to the Benguela current, which is one of the most productive fishing grounds in the world, 
the country is endowed with rich fisheries and marine resources. However, ‘the number of stocks 
is relatively low which is likely due to large variations in environmental conditions whilst these 
variations cause fluctuations in landings which are sometimes considerable’141.  As Figure 5 
below shows, averagely, the fishing sector’s contribution to GDP has varied from 2% – 5 % ever 
since independence. 
 
Figure 5 
Fishing sector contributions to GDP in percentage: current prices  
 
 
*Source: Central Bureau of Statistics National Accounts, Bank of Namibia, Ministry of Finance 
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The government has strongly promoted the development of the thriving aquaculture subsector as 
Namibia enjoys immense aquaculture potential with its attendant economies of scale. The Inland 
Fisheries Act came into force in 2003and its aims include getting communities to become active 
participants in the management of inland fisheries by granting regional councillors and 
traditional authorities the power to issue inland fisheries permits142.  
 
Mining and quarrying  
 
Mining is the major driving force in Namibia and the country is known for its diversity of 
minerals143, including base rare metals and non-metals, precious and semi-precious stones, as 
well as precious metals. The mining industry therefore continues to be a strong pillar of 
Namibia’s economy due to its relatively disproportionate contribution to state coffers, especially 
foreign exchange revenue. In recent years the industry has experienced healthy growth trends, 
with the inflow of significant investment capital and the opening of new mines; examples are the 
Scorpion Zinc mine and Ongopolo Mining and Processing Ltd at Tsumeb144.  
 
The diamond industry, due to its significance for the Namibian economy, is briefly described 
below.  
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Diamonds 
 
Diamonds have played an important role in the Namibian economy ever since they were first 
discovered in Lüderitz in 1908. De Beers, in 1931, was the sole producer through its wholly 
owned Consolidated Diamond Mines of South West Africa (CDM) until 1990 when Namibia 
gained its independence from South Africa and opened the diamond industry up to competition.  
 
In 1994, De Beers operations in Namibia were renamed NAMDEB Diamond Corporation and it 
became a 50-50 joint venture with the Government of the Republic of Namibia145. The diamond 
industry continues to be a major contributor to Namibia’s revenue as figure 6 below shows.  
 
Figure 6 
Diamond’s contributions to GDP in percentage: current prices 
 
*Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Bank of Namibia, Ministry of Finance 
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Diamond mining makes a contribution of approximately 10% to Namibia’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) but the contribution to government tax and non-tax revenues is even higher 
because diamond-mining companies pay a tax of 55% of taxable income, a 10% royalty tax, and 
dividends from NAMDEB as well as the 10% non-resident shareholders tax146.  
 
Namibia is the sixth largest diamond producer by value after Botswana, Russia, South Africa, 
Angola and Canada. This is due to the fact that Namibia largely produces ‘Gem quality’ 
diamonds which pushes up the value of its diamond production. When looking at the average 
value per carat of rough diamonds, Namibia’s diamonds are the finest in the world at US$321, 
more than double that of second-place Angola147. 
 
As Figure 7 on the next page shows, the overall contribution of the diamond mining industry to 
Government tax and non-tax revenues has almost tripled to 14.7% in 2002/03 from 5.7% in 
1990/91. Despite the economic importance of the industry, diamond mining employed only 
3,295 people in 2002 attributed to a combination of industry consolidation, technological 
improvements and the fact that marine mining is much less labour-intensive148.  
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Figure 7 
Distribution of NAMDEB Profits to Namibia’s Government and De Beers: N$ millions 
 
 
*Source: Boer, M & Sherbourne, R (2004:7) 
 
 
The significance of diamonds to Government revenue is presented below in Figure 8: 
 
Figure 8 
Diamond revenue as a percentage of total government revenue 
 
*Source: Boer, M & Sherbourne, R (2004:8) 
 
After a century of mining diamonds in Namibia, it has become clear that the industry’s future 
hinges more on marine diamond mining; evident as offshore production surpassed onshore 
output over the past few years149. Figure 9 on the next page makes this clearer: 
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Figure 9 
Onshore vs. offshore mining since 1992 
 
*Source: Boer, M & Sherbourne, R (2004: 8) 
 
As shown above, diamonds were predominantly mined onshore but this has changed as more 
diamonds have been mined offshore for the first time in 1998. This trend has continued and the 
future of diamond mining in Namibia is no longer onshore but offshore.  
 
De Beers initially used to export 100% of the Namibian diamonds to its Diamond Trading 
Company (DTC) in London. As this did not auger well with the adding value vision of the 
country the two partners sat down and drafted an agreement to change that situation which led to 
a milestone signing of a new agreement providing for up to 16% of diamonds to be retained in 
Namibia for local manufacturers150. The ultimate aim is to ensure that those diamonds are truly 
cut and polished in Namibia to create employment and transfer skills and technology to 
Namibians.  
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There are currently seven diamond polishing factories in the country employing a substantial 
number of people but compete with low-cost cutting centers of India and China and with highly 
skilled ones in Antwerp, New York and Tel Aviv151.  
 
As Namibia’s diamonds are predominantly exported to add value to other countries’ industrial 
developments, the performance of this sector is highly dependent on the activities of external 
economies, notably the United States of America which is the largest buyer of Namibian 
diamonds. Consumers in the United States of America determine the demand for Namibia’s 
diamonds meaning that if the US economy does not do well then neither do the diamonds of 
Namibia152.  
 
Secondary industry 
 
Namibia’s raw materials have generally, and are still to a large extent, being exported 
unprocessed and creating wealth and employment elsewhere while poverty and unemployment 
continues to grow in Namibia153. This includes the diamonds, beef, fish and karakul, amongst 
others154. Seeing that industrialisation is one of the ways to create employment it does not auger 
well for its quest to reduce unemployment.  
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The industrial sector is therefore still not at the level at which it plays this vital role of 
employment creation and the revitalisation of this sector will continue to be a challenge for 
Namibia155. The production of food and beverages dominates manufacturing with meat 
packaging, fish and mineral processing and beverages being the major industries156.  
 
Figure 10 
Manufacturing as a percentage of GDP: current prices 
 
 
*Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Bank of Namibia, Ministry of Finance 
 
 
The lack of a manufacturing sector in Namibia is a colonial legacy; there was hardly any training 
of people to industrialise the country as the country was rather used as a source of raw material 
to benefit the industrialised countries that owned colonies. This legacy, of not building an 
industrial base in colonies, has long been talked about and described by Kwame Nkrumah157.  
 
Since 1990 the government pursued programmes and activities aimed at transforming the 
economy from its heavy reliance on the production and export of raw materials to one in which 
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manufacturing becomes a key component.  According to the Ministry of Trade and Industry158 a 
number of policy and legislative measures have been initiated since independence in pursuit of 
the broad goal of economic growth and development.  
 
These include the Foreign Investment Protection Act159 while the 1992 White Paper on 
Industrial Development constituted the basis for the introduction of a special package of 
incentives for manufacturing activity in 1993. The Export Processing Zone Act160 established 
Namibia’s EPZ regime to serve as a tax haven for export-oriented manufacturing enterprises in 
exchange for technology transfer, capital inflow, skills development and job creation. The Policy 
and Programme for the Development of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, approved by 
Cabinet in 1997, provides the policy framework for the development of this sector as key to the 
creation of employment and wealth.  
 
Namibia’s approach to industrial development is based on the concept that there will be two 
types of manufacturing units. Some of these will be built around the utilisation of local materials 
while the other type will be based on imported components161.  
 
The limited domestic market, high transport costs and lack of skilled personnel are factors that 
contribute to the minimal manufacturing industry and manufacturing has thus rather been export 
- oriented. The SADC Bankers Data of 2007 show that Namibia’s manufacturing sector lacks far 
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behind the manufacturing sector of fellow SACU and SADC countries. There is hence an urgent 
need for value addition to Namibia’s abundant raw materials.  
 
Tertiary industry 
 
Figure 11 below shows that the biggest contributor to Namibia’s tertiary industry is the producer 
of government services sector followed by the wholesale & retail sector and the real estate & 
business services.  
 
Figure 11 
Tertiary sector contributions to GDP in percentage: current prices  
 
*Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Bank of Namibia, Ministry of Finance  
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Government financial operations 
 
Fiscally, the government has been running on tight budgets keeping the debt and deficits at 
manageable levels. For instance, the domestic public debt is about 25% and external public debt 
a little over 3% of GDP. Namibia’s fiscal performance has been rather good and therefore 
financial institutions have been more than willing to extend loans to Namibia162. The country’s 
position, however, is that they prefer not to borrow, and if they must, they will rather borrow 
locally preferably for productive projects instead of for consumption163. That stance needs to be 
applauded.  
 
Figure 12 
Revenue including Grants and expenditure as a percentage of GDP: current prices 
 
*Source: Ministry of Finance, Bank of Namibia 
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Revenue  
 
Revenue decreased marginally in 1990 / 91, compared to the previous year, mainly due to the 
demilitarisation of Namibia and the withdrawal of UNTAG164 as well as declines of taxes paid 
by the mining companies165.  
 
Namibia is in a fortunate situation where about 97% of its expenditures are funded from its own 
resources; this is fortunate because the risk of becoming dependent on donour funds can hence 
be avoided166. The revenue is predominantly allocated to social safety nets, human resource 
development in the form of education and health services and job creating investments especially 
for the tourism and agricultural sector.  
 
Namibia’s income is predominantly derived from taxes comprising of tax on revenue and profits, 
domestic taxes on goods and services and taxes on international trade. International taxes are 
dominated by SACU167 revenue and indeed SACU receipts play a very important role for 
Namibia’s income. During the 2007/ 08 fiscal year SACU revenues were estimated to comprise 
about 41% of total tax revenue168.  This income stands to be threatened by the reforms at SACU, 
the ongoing Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) and the creation of a SADC Customs 
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Union169. Namibia should therefore reduce its reliance on the Euro markets, since Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) or the Interim Economic Partnership Agreement (IEPA) will 
constrain the economic growth and development due to non – competitiveness of the Namibian 
products compared to European products170.  
 
Expenditure 
 
At independence the government set education, health, housing and agriculture as well as rural 
development amongst its priority sectors171. The lion’s share of the revenue has always gone to 
the education sector and Namibia’s expenditure target, as a percentage of GDP, is 30%172. The 
1991 / 92 expenditure increased to develop the Namibian economy173 whilst 1992 / 93 
expenditure was spent on development projects in order to address socio – economic imbalances 
inherited from colonialism.  
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Figure 13 
Expenditure analysis since 95/96: 
 
*Source: Ministry of Finance, Bank of Namibia  
 
As the figure above shows, Namibia has continuously exceeded its expenditure target of 30% of 
GDP; however the country’s problem lies rather in how its money is spent. Current expenses 
dominate the total expenses and these current expenses are further dominated by personnel 
expenses.  
 
Personnel expenditure and public spending in Namibia is high by regional standards. The first 
task of the government after independence was to adopt innovative approaches to rationalise the 
eleven ethnic administrations into one national Public Service by absorbing both those who were 
excluded by apartheid and those who served in the pre-independence administration. This 
resulted in the Namibian Public Service expanding considerably from approximately 46 500 at 
independence to about 69 478 funded posts in the 1998/99 financial year174.  
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The high wages situation was born out of the realisation that if the hard-won peace, which is a 
conditio sine qua non for development, had to be maintained, some degree of accommodation 
needed to be effected175, and as the figure shows; it indeed did.  
 
Accountability reports have lately been introduced to ensure that public money is appropriately 
spent as well as to minimise wastage of scarce resources. State – Owned Enterprises will in the 
future have to account for the subsidies they get and have been encouraged to get credit 
ratings176.  
 
Budget Deficit 
 
According to a Bank of Namibia report177, low and stable fiscal deficits are of critical importance 
for the favourable long run prospects of any country so as to avoid short – run macroeconomic 
ills of high inflation and real interest rates, amongst others. In short, it is good if debts are 
declining in the long – run. If GDP growth, budget deficits, interest rates and inflation are not in 
check any debt can become unsustainable. According to the fiscal target the budget deficit 
should not exceed 3%178 and this, according to Figure 14 below, has not been achieved for a 
number of years.  
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Figure 14 
Budget balance as a percentage of GDP  
 
*Source: Ministry of Finance, Bank of Namibia 
 
Namibia has had a budget deficit since independence that reached a peak high of 7.2 % in the 
2003/04 financial year. The first ever budget surplus, achieved in the 2006 / 07 financial year, 
was mainly due to tight expenditure management and favourable revenues from SACU.  
 
Debt  
 
At independence Namibia had a significant debt taken out by the South African Government in 
Namibia’s name. The loan was written off by the new South African ANC–led Government 
which was of the opinion that Namibia could not reasonably be expected to pay the debt because 
it had largely been taken out to fight against the liberation movement of Namibia. 
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Table 15 
Debt as a percentage of GDP 
 
*Source: Ministry of Finance, Bank of Namibia  
 
Looking at Figure 15 above indicates that Namibia’s debt level has been increasing since 
independence but has always been prudently managed and stands lower than most Sub – Saharan 
African countries; therefore, the indebtedness has generally been low, according to the World 
Bank179. The sustainability of the fiscal policy has always been important and, according to the 
Minister of Finance, over the past few years debt has been growing slower than the economy180. 
 
Namibia’s debt target is 25% of GDP and as the Figure shows that mark was exceeded in the 
financial year of 2002 / 03; the fiscal target to keep debt below 25% of GDP was achieved as of 
July 2007181 for the first time in six years. Due to the fact that Namibia prefers to borrow 
domestically instead of externally, domestic debts, which is dominated by bonds while treasury 
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bills amount for the rest, makes up the larger share of Namibia’s total debts. Foreign debt 
composition is dominated by bilateral credits182.  
 
To assess whether debt is sustainable depends largely on the real interest rates on the debt, GDP 
growth, budget deficits and debt ratio in prior perids183. A working paper on the sustainability of 
central government debt184 found that the increase in debt was mainly due to the need to finance 
the budget deficits but the good thing remains that borrowing was acquired mainly from 
domestic sources. The country, luckily, does not by and large borrow from foreign sources for 
consumption purposes but rather to finance capital projects185. Internationally, Namibia’s credit 
ratings are well and the FITCH ratings for the country in 2007 was BBB- 186.  
 
As attested to by World Bank and IMF documents187 Namibia’s economic fundamentals were 
sound, indireclty proving that World Bank and IMF rescue packages were not applicable to 
Namibia.  
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Challenges facing Namibia 
 
Income inequality and poverty 
 
Namibia, in a nutshell, is a rich country with poor people188. Although it is classified as middle – 
income it has one of the most unequal societies in the world with a Gini – Coefficient of 0.63 
while middle income countries have a rating of 0.43189. Over 60% of the population is very poor 
by Namibian standards and by the standards of the world190. According to the Director of the 
National Planning Commission, Prof Peter Katjavivi, ‘the average per capita income in Namibia 
is about US$3,400. However the wealthy, who account for only 2 percent of the households, have 
an average per capita income of about US$19,700, while the poor, accounting for 25 percent, 
have an average per capita income of US$225’191.  
 
This inequality was inherited from the colonial past and is deep – rooted; whilst a few prosper 
the majority is generally marginalized in all aspects of their life.  
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Namibia’s private sector is dominated by middle - men and – women as traders, the foreign 
natural resource exploitation companies and the foreign branches of service industry192.  It is 
these people, the previously advantaged, that amass most of the wealth to the detriment of an 
entire population. The middle – income status is therefore seen as problematic as it is neither 
representative of the broader base of the population as well as making getting AID more 
difficult.  
 
Yes, Namibia might be better off than most SADC countries but it is definitely worse off than 
the average middle – income countries. According to a Hans Seidel Foundation report (2007)193  
there is a broad class of poor people, a few people of middle class and a very limited rich upper 
class. Even though the per capita income was estimated at approximately US$ 3000 in 2006 the 
majority of the people have incomes closer to people in countries that are regarded as least 
developed194.  The Hans Seidel Foundation document adds that 35% of the population lives 
below the income poverty line of U$ 1.00 a day while about 56% of the population lives below 
the poverty line of U$ 2.00 per day.  
 
Another unfavourable factor that contributes to the status quo is the outflow of capital which 
contributes to a negative capital account. This money could be positively invested in Namibia 
and thus contribute to the alleviation of unemployment and poverty. Plans are already in place to 
amend the applicable regulations to mitigate the negative capital outflows195.  
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Economic growth over the past 18 years has, in short, not substantially reduced poverty and, 
least of all, has it been distributed to the masses.  
 
Unemployment 
 
Another crippling legacy of colonialism in Namibia is mass unemployment, which is one of the 
most pressing challenges facing the country; the unemployment rate is high even by broader 
African standards196. Despite having had sound economic growth for the past decade this growth 
has been jobless growth; in other words, despite the growth not enough employment has been 
created to absorb graduates and the growing population at large. Even though Namibia is, 
according to IMF and World Bank documents, economically stable, that does not mean that 
everything is rosy as unemployment is the big challenge Namibia faces197. Herbert Jauch is of 
the opinion that the unemployment rate in the country is a clear indication that the economy is in 
deep crisis; ‘when an economy cannot create jobs for its population then, in my view, it is time 
for crisis; a social crisis. These are signs of an economy in deep crises’198. 
 
The labour absorbtion capacity in the fastest growing sectors has been limited and in 2004 
Namibia’s unemployment rate stood at 36.7 %; the most effected are the youth where the rate is 
estimated to be around 60%, again, said to be one of the highest rates in Africa199. The IMF200 
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lists the low levels of skills, lack of diversification of the economy and labour market 
inflexibilites as the most common factors contributing to the high unemployment rate. More than 
half of the labour force is unskilled, un – or semi – educated which is traced back to the 
education system prior to independence and the challenges faced by that ministry after 
independence.  
 
Other factors contributing to the high unemployment are high skills scarcity to operate 
technology, trade policies and the significant mismatches between the sectoral shares of 
employment and their contribution to GDP; growth in Namibia has been mainly capital 
intensive, predominantly in the mining and quarrying sectors of the economy.  
 
The sectors that have potential to employ many people are the agricultural, tourist and fisheries 
sectors as well as the promotion of Small & Medium Enterprises (SME) and infrastructural 
development.  As skills development has been identified as one of the major contributors to 
unemployment the Namibian Government adopted an Education Training Sector Improvement 
Program (ETSIP) that is to address the supply of skilled labour to meet the demand in the labor 
market. ETSIP, the program that is to be financially assisted through a first – ever World Bank 
loan for Namibia will be dealt with in Chapter 4.  
 
 
 
Iipumbu Sakaria 
University of the Witwatersrand  
Masters Research Report 2009      
 
83 
 
Namibia’s first and founding President Sam Nujoma once said that ‘we believe that the success 
of our democracy, and continued peace and tranquility depend on our having a vibrant 
economy’201. In contributing to the 2008 / 09 Budget Helmuth Angula202 added that; ‘all 
economic, social and political problems are anchored around the rising unemployment and those 
problems are aggravating’.  
 
Namibia is therefore sitting on a timebomb and will need to address this potential threat before it 
becomes too late. Could some of these challenges have encouraged Namibia to seek the 
assistance of the World Bank? 
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CHAPTER III  
NAMIBIA’S RELATIONS WITH THE 
BRETTON - WOODS INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS  
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The World Bank comprises of two institutions; IBRD and IDA. The above – mentioned 
institutions, along with the IFC, MIGA203 and the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID), make up the World Bank Group204.  
 
Relations with the World Bank  
 
Namibia joined the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International 
Finance Corporation and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency shortly after 
independence. Though Namibia joined the World Bank Group in 1990 relations have been 
limited to occasional analytical and advisory activities. A number of these analytical and 
advisory services, in education, EPZ industry and water, were undertaken but none generated 
tangible outcomes205. Investment operations were also attempted though none led to actual 
projects; which was, in part, due to the projects not meeting the Government’s priorities and due 
to insufficient follow up from the World Bank206.   
 
As per the World Bank relations with their members the Minister of Finance is a member of the 
board of directors whilst the Permanent Secretary acts as an alternate member of the World 
Bank. Through technical assistance officials from the Ministry of Finance, Bank of Namibia and 
other key staff members regularly attend courses organised by the World Bank207. 
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As a lower–middle income country Namibia does not qualify for International Development 
Association funds and other concessional loans and is only eligible for IBRD funding208. To date 
the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency has not been active in Namibia.  
 
An interest by the Government in the services provided by the World Bank accelerated the 
momentum of engagement as it indicated an interest in non lending services like in – depth 
economic and sector work and technical assistance209. The analytical and advisory activities 
conducted in Namibia broadly concentrated on the economic legacy of the country, the 
developmental challenges and potential World Bank areas for support.  
 
The most evident engagements with the World Bank are in the education and environment 
sectors. This is not surprising as the World Bank is the world’s largest source of external 
investment support for improving education in middle – and low – income countries210. 
Improved relations in the education sector have been due to the results of a long – term effort 
that started with a World Bank study on the constraints and challenges faced by the education 
sector211. This report contributed to the eventual development of the ETSIP212 program with the 
assistance of 13 international and 15 national partners.  
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The other area of World Bank engagement with Namibia has been the assistance to 
environmental and nature conservation which has led to two ongoing Global Environment 
Facility projects. The GEF is an international mechanism for providing new and additional grants 
to achieve global environmental benefits in climate change, biodiversity, international waters and 
ozone layer depletion213. Namibia received grants from this Global Environment Facility in that 
respect and that grant was indeed the first ever World Bank financed project in Namibia214.  
 
The second GEF project, worth U$ 4.9 million, was approved in September 2005 and promoted 
conservation, sustainable use and mainstreaming biodiversity in coastal ecosystems215. A third 
GEF project and a country environmental analysis are on their way. 
 
Grants from the Institutional Development Fund (IDF) were used to support a public expenditure 
tracking survey (PETS) and to support Public Private Partnership against HIV / AIDS. This grant 
amounting to U$ 499 000 became effective in March 2005216.  
 
The International Financial Corporation has been involved in small investments and its portfolio 
in Namibia was U$ 16.2 million in 6 projects217. IFC’s main projects are in Pescanova, in the 
fishery industry, and an equity investment in an indigenous life insurance company. IFC has 
further provided a U$ 1.4 million loan for the construction of a 110 – room hotel in northern 
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Namibia and worked with the Namibian Agronomic Board to raise funds for a feasibility study 
of a cotton ginning industry218. The IFC is also involved in improving Namibia’s investment 
climate infrastructure through the Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS)219 and has 
recently announced a U$ 10 million loan to United Africa Group for the development of the first 
ever five – star hotel in Namibia220.  
 
Furthermore, a Public Development Information Centre has been opened at the Polytechnic of 
Namibia. This centre is a partnership initiative of the World Bank and includes the Government, 
civil society organisations and development agencies active in the centre221. The centre will 
provide free publications as part of a public information service, develop dialogue sessions on 
developmental issues and provide access to publications of development partners.  
 
The first ever Interim Strategy Note222 for the period 2007 – 2009 was presented to the World 
Bank’s Board of Executive Directors in May 2007223. According to that document the World 
Bank took Namibia’s Vision 2030 as a starting point for relations with the country224. For that 
reason, the World Bank recognises the Government as the leader in shaping the future for the 
country whilst it assists through analytical and technical assistance225.  
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According to the Interim Strategy Note for Namibia, World Bank engagements will concentrate 
on strengthening communication and coordination as well as identifying priority areas. This will 
be complemented by analytical and advisory work that will include the strengthening of local 
capacity and the development of a joint research program. The two years will also be used to 
familiarise the Namibian Government with various World Bank instruments while ensuring that 
World Bank interventions are in line with Namibia’s needs226. This will be achieved through a 
joint Government – World Bank committee representing various key partners.  
 
The remainder of the 2 year period for engagement will be based on the established areas of 
collaboration; education and environment; the usual services provided to member countries and 
analytical work joined with technical assistance227. The assistance from the World Bank Group is 
channelled through economic and sector work (ESW/AAA) and the main studies that have been 
completed include the poverty strategy, recent economic development prospects, merging 
pension system: evaluation, challenges and options, selected development impact of HIV /AIDS 
and a study on human capital development and knowledge management for economic growth228.  
 
The chairman’s concluding remarks in the Namibia Interim Strategy Note, mentioned that there 
is a need for greater IFC presence and renewed engagement with MIGA229 as the World Bank’s 
experience with ETSIP proved that it can mobilise partners and donours. The World Bank can 
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thus use that experience as a leverage to establish itself as a credible and reliable development 
partner for Namibia.  
 
The IFC has followed up on the chairman’s recommendations by granting a loan to United 
Africa Group in June 2008. We can expect engagement to increase even more through the 
second Tranche disbursement, cooperation in the health sector and the potential activation of 
MIGA engagements as suggested by the closing remarks of the chairman.  
 
There is a lot of engagement with the World Bank’s agencies – technical advice, funding of 
environmental and other projects and IFC lending to the private sector – however, the ETSIP 
loan is the first borrowing from the World Bank to the Government of Namibia; this loan will be 
looked at in the following chapter.  
 
Relations with the International Monetary Fund  
 
According to the IMF the institution is ‘the world’s central organisation for international 
monetary cooperation in which almost all countries in the world work together to promote the 
common economic good and its primary purpose is to safeguard the stability of the international 
monetary system’230. This is achieved through providing advice to countries; assisting them with 
balance of payments problems and providing technical assistance wherever it is needed231. All of 
the IMF’s 185 member countries are represented on its executive board which serves as a forum 
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where they can discuss the national, regional and global consequences of their economic 
policies232. Therefore, the governor of the Bank of Namibia is a member of the IMF while the 
deputy governor acts as the alternate member to the IMF.  
 
Namibia’s relations with the IMF date back to the days of independence. Even though the 
country does not have a formal program with the IMF, collaboration has been improving. 
Namibia joined the IMF on the 25th September 1990 and accepted the Article VIII Section 2, 3 
and 4 on the 20th September 1996233.  
 
The first governor of the Bank of Namibia, Dr. W L Bernard, was seconded to the Bank of 
Namibia by the IMF and had been recruited, by the IMF, from the Bank of Netherlands and 
assigned to the Bank of Namibia under the UNDP / IMF Technical Assistance Program. Dr. 
Bernard presided over the Bank as the governor and chairman of the Board for 13 months until 
he resigned in May 1991. As at 31st January 1992 nine (9) staff members of the Bank of Namibia 
were expatriates seconded to the Bank under the UNDP / IMF and SIDA234 technical assistance 
program235.  
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Discussions during the 2004 Article IV consultations led to a joint IMF / World Bank Financial 
Assessment Program (FSAP), a fiscal report on observance of standards and codes, and technical 
support delivered through IMF missions236.  
 
Due to the importance of having comprehensive balance of payment statistics, considerable 
effort was devoted to this area of statistics with the help of the Advisor on Balance of Payment 
Statistics under the joint IMF / UNDP technical assistance project. In 1992 staff members from 
the Bank of Namibia attended technical training courses organised by the IMF237 and more 
technical assistances have been provided since. The UNDP / IMF project on money and banking 
statistics was completed in June 1992 and when Namibia introduced its own currency all the 
necessary arrangements with the IMF, for a country introducing its own currency, were 
completed238.  
 
The IMF also assisted Namibia in expenditure control and revenue forecasting, monitoring and 
evaluation of budget execution, rationalising and streamlining of the functions of the Ministry of 
Finance and financial management in general. Technical assistance in 2007 was largely directed 
to the Bank of Namibia and the Ministry of Finance while the other beneficiary was the Central 
Bureau of Statistics239 
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The IMF sends a yearly staff mission to Namibia to conclude the Article IV consultation and 
discussions240. The 2007 mission was led by Mr. Peter Allum and the mission gave Namibia a 
generally favourable report241 as well as encouraging Namibia to subscribe to the Extractive 
Industry Transparency Initiative242, amongst many other recommendations.  
 
According to a statement by Peter Gakunu and Ebson Uanguta243 the Namibian authorities 
appreciate the IMF’s engagement and support for their economic program and appreciate and 
continue to rely on the IMF’s advice on areas of interest to the country’s policy challenges. That 
statement furthermore indicated that the Namibian authorities also trust that the IMF and the 
international community would support their request to be considered for concessional 
borrowing, given the country’s high income inequality and widespread poverty.  
 
Future IMF support is expected to focus on long–term growth prospects, fiscal and monetary 
policy as well as the exchange rate peg. A survey of the health of the financial sector and 
possible reforms of the pension systems and parastatals are also envisioned244. Additionally, and 
not surprisingly, the 2006 discussions supported the education sector reform (ETSIP) developed 
with World Bank technical assistance.  
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This chapter provides a pre – and post - independence outline of education in Namibia and 
explains how the post – independence educational challenges led to the development of ETSIP.  
 
At independence Namibia inherited an education system that was segregated along racial and 
ethnic lines and characterised by major disparities in terms of distribution of educational 
opportunities and facilities among the different sections of the Namibian community245. While 
education was compulsory for whites, Africans had to pay in cash or in kind246 as well as being 
treated to Bantu education where Standard 2 was the basis for literacy, Standard 6 for general 
labourers, Standard 8 for teachers, nurses and police while Standard 10 was the barometer for 
further and higher education. Tekaligne Godana and John M. Ashipala (2006)247 rightly conclude 
that Bantu education was a system that rather supplied labour than a means to improve society.  
 
Analyzing the system available to Africans would not surprise anybody that learners functionally 
left school illiterate. Those who taught Africans had hardly reached Standard 6 while whites had 
predominantly qualified teachers. In 1985 only 10.7% of the teachers were qualified but the 
proportion of qualified teachers differed from one administration to the other ranging from 1% in 
the Owambo Administration to about 70% in the white administration248.  Secondary and tertiary 
education was by and large not meant for Africans evident in the significant underfunding of 
schools in the populous northern regions. Teachers, parents, administrators and workers were 
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largely excluded from the decision-making process and an extremely unequal ethnic based 
financial resource allocation system manifested itself before independence249.  
 
The quality of education for Africans was compromised at an early stage and this colonial legacy 
continues to haunt the majority of the population up this very day.  
 
After independence educational reforms became one of Namibia’s priorities as the country took 
that very fragmented, unequal system and reorganised it into one national system. The Ministry 
adopted an ‘education for all’ policy and set itself five goals; namely the improved and equitable 
access to education, improved quality in the education system, enhancement of democratic 
participation in the education system, improved efficiency and the promotion of life – long 
learning250.   These post – independence education policies and visions were articulated in 
documents like ‘Towards Education for all (1993)’, Presidential Commission on education, 
culture and training (1999), Vision 2030 background study on human resources development and 
institutional capacity building (2001) as well as Vision 2030 background papers on knowledge, 
information and technology (2002)251.  
 
Despite many challenges, Namibia has achieved a certain amount of progress in education as 
eighty - three percent of adults (15+ years) and ninety percent of 15 to 24 year olds are literate 
today; complement of the ‘education for all’ policy. Net enrolment ratios for primary, basic, and 
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senior secondary education are 96, 95 and 53% respectively252. Namibia currently has 1661 
schools and 570 623 learners and 20333 teachers who are predominantly female253. Table 1 
below provides more educational statistics. 
 
Table 1 
Namibian education at a glance 
 
 TOTAL  MALE  FEMALE 
Gross Intake in Grade 1 (%) 100 99 100 
Primary Gross Enrollment Ratio (%) (7 years) 99 99 100 
Primary Repeaters (% of primary cohort) 15.1 17.4 12.9 
Primary Drop Out Rate (%) 23.8 26.5 21.2 
Primary Completion Rate (%) 74 70 77 
Expected Primary Completion Rate (%) 71 66 76 
Number of Primary Age Children Out of School (thousands) 116 64 52 
Secondary Gross Enrollment Ratio (%) (5 years) 56 52 60 
Lower Secondary (%) (3 years) 72 67 78 
Upper Secondary (%) (2 years) 29 28 30 
Tertiary Gross Enrollment Ratio (%) 6.1 5.7 6.5 
*Sources: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), World Bank, UNAIDS, ILO, Household Surveys, IMF, Country 
Data are for the most recent year available in 2000-2005. 
 
A working paper of the Bank of Namibia in 2001 concluded that the Namibian educational 
system is financially burdensome and accounts for almost 10% of GDP254. That study aimed at 
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analyzing the expenditure efficiency on the education and health sectors because these receive 
approximately half of the Namibian budget255.  
 
The worrying trend in the education sector though, is the fact that the huge investment into it 
goes predominantly to personnel costs; to the detriment of adequate textbooks and other teaching 
material. Various statistics show that current expenses account for over 90% of the education 
budget while less than 8% actually goes to capital expenditures256. This makes teaching difficult 
as you employ teachers but at the same time frustrate them because they do not have equipment 
to do their work accordingly. Financially, Namibia has always prioritized education and stands 
out as one of the biggest spenders on education and training257.  
 
Figure 16 
Education share of total budget: in percentage  
 
 
*Source: Various publications of the estimates of revenue and expenditure from the Ministry of Finance  
                                                          
255
 Ibid: 1 
256
 Ibid : 11 
257
 Namibia (2005: 75). Human capital and knowledge development for economic growth with equity. World Bank 
Working Paper Series No. 84. Washington. 
Iipumbu Sakaria 
University of the Witwatersrand  
Masters Research Report 2009      
 
99 
 
Input into education, compared to most low middle income countries, is huge; but the output of 
the education system remains low258 as manifested in the high dropout and repetition rates. To be 
precise, Namibia tops investment into education charts as well as topping lowest output tables; 
clearly confirming that there is a skewed disparity between what goes into the education sector 
and what actually comes out of it. 
 
Quality has always been difficult to measure but the best indicator of the quality of an education 
system is students’ learning achievement. In Namibia various measures pointed to a decidedly 
ineffective system259. Student performances during the Grade 10s and Grade 12s have not been 
satisfactory and always left a lot to be desired. According to Dr. Marope’s report260 student 
performance on both the 1995 and the 2000 SACMEQ261 reading literacy and mathematics 
survey was on average worse than for all comparison countries in the region. A UNESCO 
survey262 of student reading skills also showed that reading was low; only 7.6% of Grade 6 
learners had the desirable level of reading skills, while 25.9 % only achieved minimum reading 
skills.  
 
The 2000 SACMEQ II country mean scores are presented in Table 2 below:  
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   Table 2 
   SACMEQ II countries mean scores:  
 
Country  Reading score Mathematics score 
   
Seychelles 567 539 
Kenya 532 548 
Tanzania 531 508 
Mauritius  521 568 
Swaziland  515 503 
Botswana 507 499 
Mozambique  504 516 
Uganda 469 493 
Lesotho  439 435 
Namibia  436 419 
Mean score 500 500 
*Source: Namibia (2005: 38). Human capital and knowledge development for economic growth with equity.   
World Bank Working Paper Series No. 84. Washington. 
 
 
 
This was partly confirmed by a teacher, Mr. George Lututu Jnr263who revealed that up to 70% of 
learners that sit for grade 10 cannot read or comprehend the questions they are to answer. Some 
teachers in the northern part of the country, according to Mr. George Lututu Jnr264, teach certain 
subjects in their vernacular which explains why some learners score A’s and B’s in most subjects 
but get ‘Ungraded’ in English.  
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A look at the output of education in many countries shows that other countries perform better 
with less monetary injections265. Considering the mismatch in input and output of the education 
sector left the country with no other choice but to call for a presidential commission into 
education and subsequently invite the World Bank to assess education in Namibia.  
 
ETSIP  
 
ETSIP has its roots in the Presidential Commission on Education, Culture and Training which 
pointed out the shortcomings of Namibian education and called for urgent change266; 
consequently many studies were undertaken to provide background information before the 
implementation of ETSIP began in June 2006. Considering that a lot of money had been invested 
into education with very poor results, the Government267 decided to invite the World Bank to 
have a look at the education system in Namibia and provide recommendations on the way 
forward. According to a World Bank document;  ‘‘the purpose of this work was to 
comprehensively assess the education, training, and skills development sector and to advise on 
how education may best support the national development reform envisioned in Vision 2030’’268.   
 
That report concluded that the current education system could not supply the required skills 
needed by the labour market and was thus not suitable to support the developmental vision of the 
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country269.  The second major finding of the report was the prevailing inequality in the 
distribution of education outcomes and attainments. As employers had been complaining of a 
shortage of skilled labour it was further recommended that Namibia upgrade the quality of their 
skilled labour270. Harold Pupkewitz mentioned that there cannot be progress without a well 
educated workforce and made it clear that the formal sector has no room for Grade 10s, 
especially the failures. He stressed that there was an oversupply of these Grade 10s and 12s but 
mentioned that there was no quality271.  
 
After presenting the findings and recommendations of the World Bank report the cabinet 
approved the recommendations and transformed them into a 15 year sector strategic plan that is 
now known as ETSIP; also termed as the road of education to achieve Vision 2030’272. The 
conclusions that emanated from that report are as follows273; 
 
 Poor learning outcomes at all levels 
 Inefficiency of the system  
 Persisting inequalities 
 Poor relevance to the economy 
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 Poor capacity to implement reforms 
 Inadequate and declining resources, and  
 The threat of HIV / AIDS 
 
And hence recommended that Namibia;274  
 
 Improve student learning outcomes 
 Improve efficiency of the system 
 Eradicate inequalities across all levels of the system 
 Improve the economic relevance of the education and training system by expanding 
outputs where the demand is strong 
 Strengthen capacity for knowledge creation and innovation  
 Strengthen capacity to implement the reforms  
 Expand and diversify the financing base for the education and training system, and  
 Improve strategies for curbing the spread of HIV / AIDS and mitigating its impact  
 
The ETSIP program is based on Vision 2030 and aims to transform the education sector to 
support national development by improving the quality of general education in Namibia, spread 
information communication technology throughout the sector, contribute to greater efficiency 
through reduced wastage and performance contracts and reform and expand vocational education 
and training. It will further aim to strengthen tertiary education and training, develop a system of 
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knowledge management and innovation and contribute to early childhood development and pre – 
primary education, amongst others275.  
 
According to Justin Ellis it is not just a plan for education for education sake but rather for the 
nation; creating a knowledge economy, doing away with inequality and having a peaceful society 
with people co existing with each other as well as ensuring that Namibians become a life –long 
learning nation276. The report of the presidential commission into education in 1999 already 
expressed that Namibia should become a ‘learning nation in which all citizens have opportunities 
for learning throughout their lives277, which is integrated into ETSIP.  
 
In his address to the ETSIP Advocacy Campaign Minister of Education Nangolo Mbumba called 
upon all Namibians to contribute to the success of ETSIP and stressed that only through the 
collective efforts of each and everyone, can ETSIP be successfully implemented278.   
 
The Ministry of Education will be primarily responsible for the implementation of ETSIP and 
will be assisted by various stakeholders like the Ministry of Gender and Equality, Ministry of 
Information, the National Training Authority as well as the Ministry of Finance and the National 
Planning Commission, amongst others279.  
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The sector improvements entailed in ETSIP 1 will cost U$ 354.9 million and together with 
government’s efforts the World Bank’s technical support leveraged U$ 323.8 million external 
funds, leaving a financing gap of U$ 31.1 million280. As most of the external funds are 
programmed for the 3rd – 5th years of program implementation the Government requested the 
World Bank to meet half of that financing gap; U$ 15 million, to be disbursed over the first two 
years of program implementation. The U$ 323.8 million was raised at a roundtable pledging 
conference; U$ 278.8 was raised as grants while U$ 45 million was raised as a soft loan281.  
 
The first ever World Bank Loan to the Namibian Government 
 
The World Bank approved the request and granted a Development Policy Loan (DPL1) on the 
24th May 2007282 and disbursed the first tranche, U$ 7.5 million, to Namibia on the 15th July 
2008283. This U$ 15 million loan is divided into two tranches and there were prior actions that 
had to be fulfilled before the first disbursement while certain ‘triggers’ will have to have been 
complied with before the second tranche is disbursed284. 
 
As this is a policy development loan it is said to be suitable for Namibia because it focuses on 
policy, institutional and legal reforms rather than on specific investments. The overall objective 
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of this operation is to support the implementation of the first 2 years of Namibia’s Education and 
Training Sector Improvement Program285. The specific aims of DPL1 further aim to ‘support the 
development of specific policies and policy instruments to guide and give effect to planned 
sector reforms, legal instruments to enforce policy implementation and to support institutional 
capacities required for effective implementation of planned sector reforms’286.  
 
The World Bank’s approach to education has often involved addressing problems outside 
education that hinder development of the sector287 and Namibia’s loan falls exactly into this 
category as it will be used to fund policy reforms.  
 
DPL 1 will support the setting up of performance standards that all schools should keep and the 
establishment of conditional grants to enable under – resourced schools to meet set standards288.  
 
According to the DPL 1 program document the justification for the World Bank involvement in 
Namibia’s education sector is the Government’s recognition that World Bank technical 
assistance is essential for the success of the reform, the fact that the World Bank is best – placed 
to support the implementation of the reform as it contributed to developing ETSIP and to close 
the financing gap within the first two years289. Further justification comes from the fact that the 
World Bank brings leverage and confidence to donours as well as its support in raising grants for 
the ETSIP program. Last but not least, the World Bank ensures that policy; legal and institutional 
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reforms that are required to give effect to the transformation of education are indeed put into 
practice290.  
 
Potential risks associated with lending to Namibia include risks of external shocks to the 
economy, procurement system that could contribute to a delay in implementation, financial 
management risk dealing with budgeting and auditing inadequacy and interest based resistance to 
proposed policy reforms. Interest – based resistance relates to trade unions, wealthy parents and 
civil servants that would be negatively affected by some policy reforms291. Further risks deal 
with implementation delays due to over consultations and consensus building, inadequate 
implementation capacity, the threat of HIV / AIDS and the potential discontinuity of financial 
support by any of the 13 development partners292.  
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As said at the beginning of this report, many countries either resort to loans due to economic 
problems or due to the advancement of group interests and ideas.  
 
In the case of Namibia the macro – economics of the country did not warrant any World Bank 
loans or IMF interventions.  According to the Governor of the Bank of Namibia, ‘when one 
looks at Namibia’s debt ratio there is nothing indicating that Namibia could have been in trouble. 
There are countries that have to borrow just to pass a budget in their parliament and Namibia was 
definitely not in such a situation when it took the loan293. The sound macro economic state of the 
country, despite many challenges, has been documented in various reports including the 2007 
IMF Article IV Consultations and the World Bank Namibia Interim Strategy Note294.  
 
Relations with Bretton - Woods 
 
As Namibia was ideologically opposed to the World Bank it was quite difficult to work and 
operate there. In fact, Dr. Mmantsetsa Marope295, a senior education specialist at the World 
Bank, thinks that Namibia is the most difficult country she has ever worked with due to their 
stance towards the World Bank. According to Herbert Jauch296 of LaRRI, this scepticism within 
government is because SWAPO leaders, while in exile, had seen what IMF and World Bank 
influence can do. The relationship between Namibia and the Bretton - Woods institutions is 
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nonetheless very good as attested to by the governor of Bank of Namibia297; even though 
Namibia does not necessarily do everything that is advised by these institutions298. According to 
Preeti Arora the relationship has not been very strong until lately but the process is in motion. 
The World Bank is still grappling to develop relations with the government and how to prove to 
the populace that the World Bank can assist299.  
 
How did Namibia manage to stay away from Bretton - Woods’ loans? 
 
There are many reasons why Namibia managed to stay away from Bretton - Woods loans. With 
regards to the IMF, a country seeks its assistance when it encounters currency or balance of 
payment problems; as Namibia has never had such problems that could warrant IMF 
intervention, they have never had the need to borrow from the IMF.  
 
With the World Bank it was different as there were economic as well as political reasons that 
contributed to Namibia staying away from these loans. Namibia is classified as a lower middle – 
income country and hence does not qualify for concessional loans from the World Bank and 
would therefore have to borrow at interest rates that are very high and could just as well borrow 
elsewhere. The World Bank is a lender of last resort300 and with Namibia’s credit ratings the 
country can borrow money from anywhere else. This, for example, is not the case with Malawi 
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that does not have the luxury to borrow from anywhere else; they would have to come to the 
World Bank as the lender of last resort301.   
 
Namibia further adopted an attitude to first exhaust grants while borrowing was to be 
concessional. Mr. Maamberua adds that after soft loans and grants were sourced and exhausted, 
the country stood its grounds not to borrow from the IMF or World Bank302. He added that ‘the 
priority areas for the government then were clearly education and health and these are social 
development areas and you cannot take commercial loans for such social projects as they will not 
give you commercial returns’303. Ms Preeti Arora304 confirmed that there had been strong 
resistance from the Namibian treasury to borrow from the World Bank.   
 
What certainly made Namibia’s stance easier is the fact that the country has in the main not been 
heavily indebted as the government had a deliberate policy not to incur huge budget deficits, 
especially when current Minister of Finance, Saara Kuugongelwa – Amadhila,305 took over.  
 
The political reason why Namibia never borrowed from Bretton - Woods was due to the World 
Bank tendency of attaching conditions to their loans,306 as well as their neo-colonial outlook. 
According to Paul Randall307, having recently won independence the founding president, His 
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Excellency Dr. Sam Nujoma, was not going to be told what to do by these institutions. The first 
President, Dr. Sam Nujoma, confirmed this during the interview with him and made it clear that 
Namibia trades with other countries and should continue to do so but should always strive to be 
self reliant;  
 
‘At independence we adopted a policy of self reliance so that we do not need to depend on 
handouts from these institutions. No handouts so that we can prevent those who have neo - 
colonial tendencies to come and interfere in the internal affairs of our country’308, he said.  
 
His strategy premised instead on training and educating Namibians to enable them to contribute 
to the future development of the country, especially through adding value to Namibia’s abundant 
natural resources. According to him the country can only be developed through the hard work of 
Namibians themselves and not through philanthropic gestures from foreign institutions; 
 
 ‘‘Africa cannot be build on the policies that emanate from everywhere but Africa. So here we 
make our own policies based on self reliance, hard work and discipline and ensuring that 
Namibians are ruled by Namibians in the interest of the Namibian people as well as Africa by 
Africans and the assistance of the Diaspora’’309.   
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According to Eugenia Marinova from the World Bank310 Namibia did not take loans because at 
that time there was no interest to take loans. She explained that there are things that people 
borrow money from a bank for and other things that people do not borrow for. Countries were, 
according to her, also still hesitant due to the conditionalities that used to be attached to loans.   
 
Mr. Maamberua adds that perhaps Namibia has had the benefit of late independence and knew 
what these loans did to other countries and this might have influenced them not to take loans. A 
similar view was observed by Herbert Jauch311 who affirmed that there was a healthy scepticism 
towards these institutions at independence.  
 
Will the loan be repaid in time? 
 
The research found a firm confirmation that the loan will be easily payable as it is seen as a small 
amount and therefore poses no threat to meeting the scheduled repayments312. Additionally, the 
World Bank foresees a low risk that the good economic management will be threatened during 
the period of engagement. This, according to the World Bank Namibia Interim Strategy Note, 
rests on Namibia’s track record of sound economic management, moderate level of external 
indebtedness and the fairly good credit ratings assigned to the country by Fitch313.   
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Conditionalities of the loan 
 
According to Namibia’s Prime Minister the loan did not come with conditionalities per se except 
that Namibia needs to achieve what it said it would do314. ‘There were no conditionalities as such 
but prior actions that the government was in any case going to take and these were derived at 
jointly’, explained Eugenia Marinova315. So there are no ulterior motives behind the conditions 
attached to the loan as confirmed by Ms Preeti Arora who mentioned that the World Bank does 
not have an agenda and does not just impose things on countries316. According to Dr. Marope the 
conditionalities are taken from Namibia’s own policies and all Namibia has to do now is 
implement them317; literally meaning that the World Bank will only act as an oversight to ensure 
that Namibia implements its own decisions.  
 
The World Bank proposal for ETSIP funding318 makes it clear that;  
 
‘the disbursement of the loan will follow the World Bank’s disbursement procedures for Development Policy Loans 
and will be disbursed against satisfactory implementation of the development policy program and not tied to any 
specific purchases or be subject to procurement requirements. If the proceeds of the loan are used for ineligible 
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purposes, as defined in the Loan Agreement319, upon notice from the World Bank the Borrower will be required to 
promptly refund an amount equal to the amount of said payments’.   
 
The money must be accounted for and an audited report of the account will have to be sent to the 
World Bank and the participating development partners. According to the ETSIP Coordinator, 
Mr. Justin Ellis, the conditions are problematic; in his own words;  
 
‘The kind of loan we took is not a project loan but development policy loan meaning that the loan is taken on 
condition that certain development policies are being implemented. These policies have a term known as Prior 
Actions. So to get the 1st Tranche loan we had to fulfil prior actions, a string of them. 12, 20....so these were things 
we had to show that we had done them. In the 2nd round we are dealing with 17 prior actions, I should say that they 
are pragmatic. So this is a kind of contract, if you want money; they will agree, they will give you money but you 
must show us that you are doing the things that you said you will do. We had one on textbooks, we had to get a new 
policy of textbooks developed and accepted by cabinet and this was done, as well as an early childhood development 
policy.  
 
They get more and more difficult. I think what will happen is that the World Bank will now need to see results, 
meaning they won’t look at programmatic things but they will assess the improvement of learners. The European 
Union has notified us that they are not interested in pragmatic results but in quality results, they want to see how the 
learners are doing. Are our policies being effectively implemented, are they successful? They will assess the results 
of the learners. So this is a very difficult process, I don’t think it is easy for anybody, if there is no change there 
won’t be money coming anymore. Education is a difficult thing; education is a long term learner; if I would want to 
improve a Grade 10 learner than I can’t start in the 10th grade; so this thing will give us problems in the future. It 
can’t be done overnight, some of these things take time. That is the difficult thing in these conditions320’.  
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All prior actions have been met to disburse the first tranche and they included the adoption of a 
national HIV / AIDS policy for the education sector, approval of the policy on ICT in the same 
sector, transfer of pre – primary education from the Ministry of Gender Equality and Child 
Welfare to the Ministry of Education, approval of the Vocational Education and Training Bill, 
the establishment of the National Council for Higher Education, the establishment of the  
Namibia Training Authority and the establishment of the Advisory Council for Teacher 
Education in Namibia321. Prior actions taken under the DPL 2 program included:   
 
• Tertiary pre – entry programs in mathematics, science and information, communications 
and technologies enrolling 50 students per area 
• Approve the revised lower primary curriculum and start implementing it 
• Approve national textbook policy 
• Assign academic performance targets to each primary and secondary school  
• The baseline data to enable the establishment of a school register of needs  
• Approve a new formula for determining applicable levels of subsidies to private schools 
• De – link teacher salaries from unnecessary and irrelevant qualifications and link it to 
performance322  
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Implications of ‘new’ relations 
 
The Prime Minister made it clear that Namibia has not engaged into new relations with the Bank, 
Namibia remains a member of the Bank and relations will continue just like before the loan.   
 
Others were of the opinion that the implications point to a greater influence for the World Bank 
in the country. As Herbert Jauch put it; ‘when you do not owe them money you can, at least in 
theory, choose to ignore and not follow their advice; but now it gives them of course much 
greater say because once certain loans are tied to certain performances the World Bank will have 
stronger influence’323. I certainly agree with this statement, and as Mr. Maamberua said; ‘many 
countries that borrowed from the World Bank had the World Bank literally taking over an 
economy and indirectly running it through structural adjustment and the likes324. It is not so 
much the size of the loan but maybe the interventions of the World Bank that will matter; once 
they lend you money they somehow have a hold of you’.  
 
An additional implication, according to Mr. Maamberua325, is that the country will be in it for a 
long time. These loans come with conditions to assure the World Bank that they will get their 
money back. Once you take loans you literally co – manage the economy with the World Bank 
which can negatively affect sovereign decision – making in the country. A clear implication will 
further be the need to increase the capacity to comply with the conditionalities and if that 
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capacity is not there then Namibia will have to invest in it or go back to the World Bank so as to 
implement the project.  
 
After the 2nd Tranche loan the memorandum of understanding says that Namibia will pay directly 
for technical assistance326 and Namibia has therefore set aside U$ 2 million to pay for World 
Bank technical support beyond the first two years of the loan to ensure the program’s technical 
sustainability. On a need base, this fund may also be used to cover upstream analytical work that 
will reinforce implementation downstream327.   
 
The Secretary General of the Namibia National Student Organisation328, although praising 
ETSIP, did not welcome the World Bank loan and called it a blunder. He said; ‘we all know 
what the World Bank is about and what they have done to many, many countries; thus asking 
money from such an institution for such a vital area like education is really disappointing’. He 
added that; ‘when you take loans from these institutions they would want you to follow their 
advice and also restrict who you should have relations with. If they do not like a certain country 
they can affect or influence you to break ties with that country’.  
 
Herbert Jauch thinks that the move to accept World Bank loans was unnecessary and will in the 
medium term also be counterproductive, because it opens the door for more World Bank 
advisors to have an increasing influence in education, literally a foot in the door policy. History 
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showed that this leads to the commodification of education, introducing user pay principles, and 
making education efficient cost wise329.  
 
Did Namibia ever feel that it needed Bretton Wood’s loans before? 
 
Namibia has never in the past felt that it needed Bretton - Woods loans as confirmed by the 
Founding President Sam Nujoma, the Governor of the Bank of Namibia Tom Alweendo, the 
advisor to the Minister of Finance, and Mr. Maamberua as well as a senior researcher from 
LaRRI330. Namibia, more than anything else, has sought the technical assistance and tapped into 
the World Bank as a knowledge institution instead of seeking money from it. That knowledge is 
appreciated as the World Bank can give ‘uncomfortable’ advice to any country; the country does 
not have to do what is advised but it is always good to listen331.  
 
Why then did Namibia break its practice and seek a loan from the World Bank? 
 
Rt. Hon. Prime Minister Nahas Angula says Namibia is not an island and needs the external 
community to function, therefore Namibia, just like other countries, is a member of the World 
Bank and may need the World Bank in one way or another332. According to him333, Namibia 
engaged the World Bank as a knowledge institution to develop ETSIP. As the costs of ETSIP 
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could not be met by the government alone a roundtable pledging conference was organised, with 
the assistance of the World Bank, and attracted a lot of donours including the EU.  
 
The donours then questioned the aid effectiveness of the country and demanded oversight of 
their funds if they were to provide money for ETSIP. As this oversight could only be provided by 
the World Bank, the institution said that if it was to provide that oversight Namibia will have to 
take a loan to provide that service334. As the donours made it clear that without oversight there 
would be no money, and since the World Bank was the only institution that could provide that 
oversight, they demanded that Namibia take out a loan to pay for that service. Namibia therefore, 
according to the Prime Minister, took the loan so as to retain the World Bank oversight that was 
needed by the donours.  
 
Mr. Paul Randall335 gave a similar account as he maintains that the loan was a condition for 
continuing to receive technical assistance for ETSIP. According to the ETSIP Program 
Coordinator, Mr. Justin Ellis, the government decided to take that loan mainly as a way of 
retaining technical advice and the commitment of the World Bank to the program336. 
 
There is another view with regards to why Namibia eventually took that loan. According to Mr. 
Buti Hambira, an economist in the Ministry of Finance and, at the time of the interview, the 
acting personal assistance to the Minister of Finance, Namibia was literally trapped as technical 
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assistance was conditional to taking a loan from the World Bank; according to him the World 
Bank Pretoria Office country representative has always had ulterior motives as she was there for 
a long time and it looked bad not to ‘get’ Namibia337. He therefore concludes that Namibia was 
trapped as the loan was literally forced onto the country. A further perspective adds that ‘the 
World Bank played it very clever as they manoeuvred their way through technical assistance. 
‘These experts came in to review education and then we got ETSIP. They were then, obviously, 
contributing to its funds338’, opinionated Herbert Jauch. This is in line with the research findings 
of Laila Smith339 who concluded that the World Bank manoeuvres through technical assistance 
to create a lending relationship with countries that initially refused to do so. 
 
Herbert Jauch’s observation suggests that Namibia took that loan because neoliberal type of 
thinking has found its way into Namibia ‘as the government seems to have adopted a market – 
driven development strategy which is largely due to advice from Bretton - Woods’340. According 
to Herbert Jauch before independence SWAPO was already moving away from its socialist 
ideals and after independence introduced a very moderate reformist agenda based on capitalist 
economy341. The changes, prior to independence, were all indicators towards a shift to those 
policies and the commercialisation and privatisation schemes in the later 1990s were clear signs 
of neoliberalism and shows that the government was clearly listening to Bretton - Woods’342.  
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Herbert Jauch argues that Namibia has adopted a neoliberal approach to economic policies with 
some social welfare system here and there, but in terms of key financial and economic policies 
Namibia has definitely gone neoliberal. However, Tom Alweendo343 thinks that no country 
actually decides to follow one principle at the expense of the other; ‘it is all situational really and 
the differences are not so much pronounced; we have a mixture of both and at the end of the day 
these concepts are just theoretical and for academic purposes only’. 
 
Anyways, according to the Governor of Namibia’s Central Bank, not all debt is bad. ‘If you 
borrow to invest then that debt is good, unlike when you borrow for consumption; but for 
infrastructural development you can borrow and that is good debt as long as it is within your 
target344. The Prime Minister also attested to this saying that borrowing from the World Bank is 
principally not bad; it just really depends what you borrow for345. 
 
The World Bank is not an ordinary bank, it offers technical assistance besides just providing 
loans; this assistance, according to Eugenia Marinova, is appreciated by countries and also 
contributes to them accepting loans from the World Bank as other banks will just give you the 
money and then leave.  
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The classical explanation, though, came from Dr. Marope346 who used a Chinese saying to 
explain Namibia’s decision to eventually taking a loan, saying that; ‘sometimes you need to ride 
the back of the dragon to cross the river’.  
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As the literature alludes to, loans from Bretton – Woods are geared to advance neo – liberal 
policies that, at the end of the day, preserve the interests of these institutions. Though the loans 
are said to be beneficial to recipient countries, these benefits are only short – lived and the 
negative implications far outweigh the good that these loans are supposed to achieve. As the 
statement of Dr. Marope suggests, it is clear that these institutions are indeed risky and 
potentially dangerous to borrow from347.  
 
As Laila Smith said, ‘‘the World Bank uses its knowledge brokering role as a device to facilitate 
the development of a lending relationship with countries that may initially be reluctant to enter 
into this kind of engagement’’348. The World Bank indeed paraded itself as a knowledge 
institution, what was initially perceived to be only technical assistance turned out to become a 
lending relationship.  
 
Namibia’s economy did in fact not show any signs of failures needing the bailout, intervention or 
assistance of the World Bank or IMF. Yes, the country faced a big challenge with education but, 
from my own perspective, the World Bank worked it cleverly to ensure that Namibia finally 
takes a loan from them.  
 
As already highlighted at the beginning of the report, the main objective was to find out why and 
how Namibia stayed away from Bretton - Woods’ loans since independence and consequently 
find out why Namibia eventually broke that practice.  
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The findings point to a healthy skepticism within government towards these institutions as a 
driving motive of abstaining from these loans as well as to a confirmation of Laila Smith’s349 
analysis that the World Bank uses its knowledge brokering role as a device to lure countries, 
which were initially not keen on lending from the World Bank, into lending relations.    
 
Namibia hence invited the World Bank, as a knowledge institution, to assess its education and 
provide recommendations as to how the education sector can be used as a vehicle to achieve or 
contribute to Vision 2030 which was done because the huge input into education did not match 
the poor output that the system produced.   
 
The Bretton Woods Institutions have the interests of their sponsors to cater for and will thus 
continue to advance neoliberal policies that are eventually aimed at getting governments to 
accept Washington consensus-type policies and ensure that the interests of the developed 
countries are eventually supported. It is business as usual and he who pays the piper dictates the 
tune; therefore Namibia should abstain from Bretton - Woods’ loans as much as possible. Once 
you owe the World Bank or IMF money, it is more difficult to pursue your own independent 
development path.  
 
With regards to ETSIP and the current loan, I recommend that the country implement the 
conditionalities as outlined in the Development Policy Loans and Agreements so as to retain the 
financial support of the donours to the ETSIP program. The World Bank has leverage power and 
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as soon as conditions are not satisfactorily complied with donours will be told to hold their 
money which can negatively affect the implementation of ETSIP. It is therefore further 
suggested that ETSIP be sustained, as much as possible, through local funding so as to avoid any 
disruptions caused by the potential withdrawal of donours for whatever reasons.   
 
Relations with the Bretton - Woods Institutions should not be underestimated and taken lightly as 
their sponsors indeed have controversial and interest – based economic, development and 
political outlooks. The country hence needs to ensure that future relations with these institutions 
are not to the detriment of the socio – economic development and quest for economic 
emancipation in Namibia. The future generation should remain with the policy space to 
contribute towards their own development instead of just nurturing the interest of the sponsors of 
the IMF and World Bank.  
 
Although these institutions are said to have changed, and are still changing, the predominant 
view still holds that these are indeed western imperialist machineries that aim to unlock the 
world’s natural resources and cheap labour for the benefit of their sponsors350 and the local class 
interests that are to gain from something that is to the detriment of the masses. For that reason, 
careful and informed engagement with these institutions will be vital for the future people - 
centered socio – economic development of the country and the attainment of Vision 2030.  
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Namibia as a country needs to be congratulated for its progressive stance on the Bretton - Woods 
Institutions over the past years which greatly contributed to no indebtedness to these institutions. 
In the same vein, Namibia must learn from its current experience with the World Bank that 
further technical assistance will, as well, be geared towards projects that will eventually require 
loans from the World Bank. The World Bank provides non – lending services and technical 
assistance, not attached or conditioned to future loans, should be the way to go.  
 
This study has convinced me that further research is required into the field of Namibia – Bretton 
Woods’ relations so as to enhance the actual benefit to both stakeholders. I further found that the 
involvement of these institutions in the economies of developing countries is inevitable, but, 
alone; not sufficient for sustainable socio – economic development as the interests of the 
sponsors of Bretton Woods and those of the masses of developing countries indeed head into 
opposite directions.  
 
But, as often proclaimed by Kwame Nkrumah, it can only be achieved through unity of purpose 
and action. Groups of countries should cooperate to help one another and use regional 
development banks rather than turning to the technical advice, loans and bailouts from the 
Bretton –Woods institutions. Further, there may be help from other governments and other 
institutions that may not be pushing neo-liberal policies and countries can thus improve their 
bargaining power with the West and the Bretton –Woods institutions by leveraging cooperation 
and support from other non-neo-liberal countries; examples are the good relations existing 
between developing countries and China.  
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It certainly is possible; ‘the budding future is always stronger than the withering past’351. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
351
 Nkrumah, K (1965: 252). Neo – colonialism; the last stage o imperialism. Panaf Books. London  
Iipumbu Sakaria 
University of the Witwatersrand  
Masters Research Report 2009      
 
130 
 
Bibliography 
 
Abrokwaa, C (1999). Africa 2000: What Development Strategy? Journal of Black Studies. SAGE 
Publications  
 
Alweendo, T (2000). The challenges of Monetary Policy for Namibia within the Common 
Monetary Agreement. A Paper read at the Bankers Conference on the 6th October 2000. 
Windhoek  
 
Angula, H (2008). Global Economic Environment and the Economy of Namibia. Statement for 
the 2008 Budget. Windhoek  
 
Angula, N (1998). SAPs: A wrong diagnosis & a mistaken prescription. The Namibian 
Newspaper. 13th March 1998 
 
Bank of Namibia (various). Annual Symposium. Windhoek  
 
Bank of Namibia (various). Annual Reports. Windhoek   
 
Bank of Namibia (various). Economic Outlooks. Windhoek  
 
Iipumbu Sakaria 
University of the Witwatersrand  
Masters Research Report 2009      
 
131 
 
Bank of Namibia (various): Quarterly Bulletins. Windhoek 
 
Bank of Namibia (2004). Central Government Debt Sustainability. Working paper of the 
Research Department of the Bank of Namibia. Windhoek  
 
Bernstein, A. (2005). “Why Globalisation Works”, in New Frontiers. Issue 3 February 2005, The 
Centre for development and Enterprise. 
 
Block, F. L (1997). The origins of international economic disorder: A study of US International 
Monetary Policy from WWII to the Present, Berkeley University of California Press 
 
Boer, M & Sherbourne, R (2004). Managing Diamond Dependency: Should Namibia risk more 
to gain more? Institute for Public Policy Research Report No. 6. IPPR. Windhoek 
 
Bond, P (2006). Talk left, Walk right: South Africa’s frustrated global reforms. UKZN Press 
 
Bracking, S (1999). Review of African Political Economy No. 80:207 – 226. ROAPE 
Publications  
 
Brown, Richard P.C (1992). Public Debt and Private Wealth: Debt, Capital Flight and the IMF 
in Sudan. London: Macmillan (Chapter 2: The Evolution of the IMF’s Role in Sub - Saharan 
Africa.)  
Iipumbu Sakaria 
University of the Witwatersrand  
Masters Research Report 2009      
 
132 
 
 
Central Bureau of Statistics. National Accounts 1983-1998 and Preliminary National Accounts 
2007, Windhoek. 
 
Central Bureau of Statistics (2006). Namibia Household Income & Expenditure Survey 2003 / 
2004. Central Bureau of Statistics. Windhoek 
 
Central Bureau of Statistics (2008). A Review of poverty and inequality in Namibia. Windhoek   
 
Chang, H-J (2005). Kicking away the ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective. 
Anthem Press, London 
 
Cohen, Joseph Nathan (2007). "The Impact of Neoliberalism, Political Institutions and Financial 
Autonomy on Economic Development, 1980–2003" Dissertation, Department of Sociology, 
Princeton University. Defended June 2007 
 
Ferguson, J. (1995). From African Socialism to Scientific Capitalism: Reflection on the 
Legitimation Crisis in IMF – ruled Africa. “In Debating Development Discourse: Institutional 
and Popular Perspectives, David B. Moore and Gerald J Schmitz, eds. London: Macmillan 
 
Ferrard.D, Gibson.A, Scott.A (2004). Making markets work for the poor. An objective and an 
approach for governments and development agencies. ComMask Trust. Johannesburg 
Iipumbu Sakaria 
University of the Witwatersrand  
Masters Research Report 2009      
 
133 
 
 
Gibbon, P (1992). “The World Bank and African Poverty, 1973 – 91.” Journal of Modern 
African Studies, V. 30, no.2  
 
Hall, P. (1989) ‘Conclusion: The Politics of Keynesian Ideas’ in Hall, P. (ed.) ‘The Political 
Power of Economic Ideas- Keynesianism across Nation’ Princeton: Princeton University Press 
 
Hanns Seidel foundation (2007). Namibia at a Glance. Windhoek  
 
Hiatt, S (2007). A Game as Old as Empire: the Secret World of Economic Hitman and the Web 
of Global Corruption. Berrett – Koehler. San Francisco  
 
Hopwood, G (2008). Guide to Namibian politics. Namibia institute for democracy. Windhoek 
 
International Monetary Fund (2008). Namibia Country Report No: 08 / 82; Namibia  
 
International Monetary Fund (various). Article IV Discussions with Namibia  
 
Jauch, H (1999). Structural Adjustment Program: Their origin and international experiences. 
Background Paper. Labour Resource and Research Institute 
 
Iipumbu Sakaria 
University of the Witwatersrand  
Masters Research Report 2009      
 
134 
 
Kalenga, P (2001). Monetary Policy Framework in Namibia. Paper presented at the Conference 
on Monetary Policy Framework in Africa. Pretoria 
 
Kiondo, A (1993). Political implications of Tanzania’s economic reforms: 1982 – 1984. 
Conference Paper presented in October 1993. University of Dar es Salaam  
 
Lehman, H P (1993). Indebted Development: Strategic Bargaining and Adjustment in the Third 
World. London: Macmillan (Chapter 4: The State and Debt Management Strategies.) 
 
Mathibeng, A C (2001). The role of international financial institutions and the debt crisis: a case 
study of Uganda. University of the Witwatersrand. Johannesburg 
 
Marais, H (1998). South Africa - limits to change: the political economy of transition. Zed Press 
 
Martin, M (1991). The Crumbling Facade of African Debt Negotiations: No Winners. (Chapter 
2: Negotiating Economic Policy with the IMF). Macmillan; London 
 
Melady, T. P (1996). Western policy and the third world. Hawthorn Books, Inc. New York 
 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (1990). Foreign Investment Act. Windhoek 
 
Iipumbu Sakaria 
University of the Witwatersrand  
Masters Research Report 2009      
 
135 
 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (1995). Special Incentives for Manufacturers and Exporters. 
Windhoek. 
 
Mkandawire, R & Soludo, C (1999). Our continent, our future: African perspectives on 
structural adjustment. Africa World Press, Inc. Eritrea. Codesria 
 
Mohamed, S (2008). Economic Policy, Globalisation and the Labour Movement: Changes in the 
global economy from the golden age to the neoliberal era. Global Labour University Working 
Papers. Berlin 
 
Mosley, P; Harrigan, J and Taye, J (1991). Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy - based 
lending. (London and New York: Routledge, 1991). (Chapters 3,4,5) 
 
Mwanza, A (1992). Structural Adjustment Programs in the SADC. Natprint. Harare 
 
National Planning Commission (2007). Namibia’s Economic Challenges & how the donour 
community can assist. Country Paper for the International Conference on Development 
Cooperation with Middle Income Countries (MICs), Madrid, Spain, 01 – 02 March 2007  
 
New African (2003). A special report on Namibia. IC Publications. November 2003 
 
Iipumbu Sakaria 
University of the Witwatersrand  
Masters Research Report 2009      
 
136 
 
Ndishishi, A (2002). Industrial policy, trade strategy and growth in Namibia. Paper presented 
at the Bank of Namibia Annual Symposium, 2002. Bank of Namibia. Windhoek 
 
Nkrumah, K (1963) Africa Must Unite. Heinemann. London 
 
Nkrumah, K. (1965). Neo colonialism: the last stage of imperialism. Panaf Books. London  
 
Noorbakhsh, F; Paloni, A (2001). Structural Adjustment and growth in sub – Saharan Africa: the 
importance of complying with conditionality. Economic Development and Cultural Change. 
Chicago  
 
Peet, R (2003). Unholy Trinity: The IMF, World Bank and WTO. University of Witwatersrand 
Press. Johannesburg  
 
Perkins, J (2004). Confessions of an Economic Hitman. Berett Koehler. New York 
 
Republic of Namibia (Various). Budget Statements. Ministry of Finance. Windhoek  
 
Republic of Namibia (Various). Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks. Ministry of Finance. 
Windhoek  
 
Republic of Namibia (2000). Namibia: A decade of peace, democracy and prosperity, 1990 – 
2000. John Meinert Printing. Windhoek  
Iipumbu Sakaria 
University of the Witwatersrand  
Masters Research Report 2009      
 
137 
 
 
Republic of Namibia (2000). The State of the Nation addresses by the President of the Republic 
of Namibia. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. John Meinert Printing. Windhoek 
 
Republic of Namibia (2004). Vision 2030. Office of the President. Namprint. Windhoek 
 
Republic of Namibia (2004). National Report on the development of education in Namibia. 
Paper presented at the International Conference on Education: Geneva 2004. Ministry of Basic 
Education, Sport and culture. Windhoek 
 
Republic of Namibia (2004). Namibia’s foreign policy and diplomacy management. Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Windhoek  
 
Republic of Namibia (2007). Education Training Sector Improvement Program (ETSIP): 
Planning for a learning nation. Programme document phase 1 (2006 – 2011). Ministry of 
Education. Windhoek  
 
Republic of Namibia (2007). Report to the SWAPO PARTY Congress on the work of Government 
Offices, Ministries and Agencies. Office of the Prime Miniser. Windhoek 
 
Shimi, I (2002). An overview of Namibia’s investment and growth performance, 1990 – 2001. 
Paper presented at the Bank of Namibia Annual Symposium, 2002. Bank of Namibia. Windhoek 
Iipumbu Sakaria 
University of the Witwatersrand  
Masters Research Report 2009      
 
138 
 
 
Sikkink, K (1991). “Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina”, Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press 
 
Skalnes, T (1993). The State, Interest Groups and Structural Adjustment in Zimbabwe. Journal of 
Development Studies. 29: 401 – 428 
 
Smith, L (2007). Power and the hierarchy of knowledge: A review of a decade of the World 
Bank’s relationship with South Africa. Science Direct Journal. Geoforum 39 (2008) 
 
Stein, H (1995). “The World Bank, Neo-Classical Economics and the Application of Asian 
Industrial Policy to Africa”, in Asian Industrialization and Africa: Studies in Policy Alternatives 
to Structural Adjustment, Howard Stein, ed. New York: St Martin’s 1995 
 
Stein, H (1999). Globalisation, Adjustment and the structural transformation of African 
economies? : The role of international financial institutions. CSRG Working Paper No. 32 / 99 
 
Stiglitz, J (2002). Globalisation and its Discontents London. Allen Lane. London   
 
Stiglitz, J (2006). “Making Globalisation Work: The Next Steps to Global Justice”. Allen Lane. 
London 
 
Iipumbu Sakaria 
University of the Witwatersrand  
Masters Research Report 2009      
 
139 
 
Wade, R (1996). ‘Japan, the World Bank and the Art of Paradigm Maintenance – the East Asian 
Miracle in Political Perspectives’ 
 
Woods, N (2002). “Global Governance and the Role of Institutions” in D. Held & A. McGrew 
(eds) Governing Globalisation: Power, Authority and Global Governance Cambridge: Polity 
Press 
 
World Bank (2005). Namibia Human Capital and Knowledge Development for Economic 
Growth with Equity. Africa Region Human Development Working Paper Series – No. 84. 
Washington  
 
World Bank: (2007). Meeting of the Board of Executive Directors. Namibia Interim Strategy 
Note. Chairman’s concluding remarks (document No. 39908) 
 
World Bank (Various). Annual Reports. Washington  
  
World Bank (2007). Program document for a proposed first development policy loan to the 
Republic of Namibia for first Education and Training Sector Improvement program. Report No: 
38571. 27 April 2007.  Washington 
 
 
 
Iipumbu Sakaria 
University of the Witwatersrand  
Masters Research Report 2009      
 
140 
 
Appendix A 
List of Interview Questions: 
 
• How did Namibia’s economy perform since independence?  
• How is the relationship between Namibia and the World Bank and IMF? 
• How has Namibia, unlike many other countries, stayed away from World Bank /IMF 
loans?  
• Did Namibia ever feel that it needed World Bank or IMF rescue?  
• Why has Namibia decided to break tradition and take that loan from the World Bank? 
• Will Namibia be able to repay that loan in time? 
• What are the implications of this new relationship with the Bretton Woods Institutions?  
• Has Namibia changed its policy towards these institutions?  
• How has education fared since independence?  
• What exactly is ETSIP? 
• What conditionalities came with the World Bank loan? 
• How can Namibia protect itself from the onslaught of economic globalisation which is in 
some quarters even seen as a new form of neo - colonialism? 
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Appendix B 
List of Interviewees: 
NAME CAPACITY PLACE DATE 
    
His Excellency Dr. Sam Nujoma First President: Republic of Namibia Windhoek 19th June 2008 
Rt. Hon Nahas Angula Prime Minister: Republic of Namibia  Windhoek  9th October 2008 
Mr. Tom Alweendo Governor: Bank of Namibia  Windhoek  11th June 2008 
Preeti Arora  World Bank: Senior Country Economist  Pretoria 26th August 2008 
Eugenia Marinova  World Bank: Country Officer Pretoria 5th September 2008 
Dr. Mmantsetsa Marope  World Bank: Senior Education Specialist  Pretoria / 
Waterkloof  
2nd October 2008 
Usutua Maamberua Private capacity; former Permanent 
Secretary in the Ministry of Finance  
Johannesburg 24th September 2008 
Justin Ellis  ETSIP – Program Coordinator  Windhoek  16th June 2008 
Sandra van Zyl  Ministry of Education  Windhoek  16th June 2008 
Paul Randall  Special Advisor to the Minister of 
Finance  
Windhoek  26th June 2008 &  
8th October 2008 
Herbert Jauch  Senior Researcher: LaRRI Windhoek  16th June 2008 
Buti Hambira  Economist: Ministry of Finance  Windhoek 26th June 2008 
Alfred Ndabeni Chief Trade Promotion Officer  Windhoek  10th June 2008 
Ndeulipula Hamutumwa  Diamond Research Fellow  Windhoek  7th October 2008 
Neville Andre  SG - Namibia National Student 
Organisation  
Windhoek  18th June 2008 
George Lututu Jnr.  Teacher  Windhoek  22nd June 2008 
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